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Like most Latin American countries, Ecuador was strongly affected by the debt crisis that was 
sparked in 1982. The impact, however, was particularly severe in Ecuador, as a decade-long period 
of oil-induced rapid growth and import substituting industrialization suddenly ended. In the following 
years, economic stagnation and social deterioration prevailed while the country slowly adopted 
structural adjustment policies and shifted to an export promotion strategy. 
The main objective of this article is to evaluate the social effects of structural adjustment in 
Ecuador, with emphasis on income distribution, poverty, and employment. It begins with a brief 
analysis of the Ecuadorean experience in the Latin American context, followed by an overview of 
structural adjustment policies (SAPs) in Ecuador, and a study of their economic results and social 
effects. As household survey annual information is available only for the urban sector from 1988 
onwards, the analysis will focus on the urban sector during the 1988-1993 period. Finally, an overall 
evaluation of the country's performance will be presented. 
ECUADOR IN THE LATIN AMERICAN CONTEXT. 
Since this case study forms part of a comparative project on the Latin American experience, 
an initial evaluation of Ecuador's performance in the regional context is called for. From this 
perspective, some general and distinctive features of the country's experience can be identified. 
To provide an introductory overview, I selected several economic indicators comparing 1993 
with 1980. (see Table 1). Broadly speaking, the regional economic performance has been strongly 
affected by the crisis, and the recent recovery is still weak and concentrated in a limited group of 
countries. In 1993, per capita GDP was lower than in 1980, and in 1994 it still remained 2.4 % 
below the 1980 level'. In spite of the adoption of an export promotion strategy, regional per capita 
export purchasing power in 1993 was only 9% higher than in 1980.2 Despite the 1990s recovery, the 
annual growth rate of export purchasing power between 1980 and 1993 was 2.7%, scarcely above 
the population growth rate (2%). 
See: CEPAL, Preliminary (h'erview of the Latin American and Caribbean Economy, 1994. 
2Export purchasing power is calculated by deflating export quantum by terms of trade indices. Terms of trade are 































































































































































































































































































































Source: Table 1. 
Note: A regression lme and 95% confidence intervals for the unweighted cases have been added. 
Growth in export quantum, nevertheless, was high, at 5.6% per year. Declining terms of trade 
explain the difference. As 64% of regional exports in 1992 were primary products, and the weight 
of traditional goods --such as textiles-- among manufactured exports is high, Latin America is 
particularly vulnerable to worsening terms of trade. 
Latin American performance is also uneven among countries. To summarize Table 1, two 
indices --Per capita GDP and per capita export purchasing power-- are plotted in Chart 1. Only five 
countries --Chile, Colombia, Uruguay, Costa Rica and Panama-- were able to improve in both 
vanables. Among them, Chile and Uruguay implemented most of their structural adjustment programs 
in the 1970s, Colombia was one of the countries less affected by the debt crisis, and Costa Rica has 
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Analysing the quadrants in Chart 1, three main groups can be identified:3 countries that 
performed well on both variables, those with an improvement in export performance and a decline 
in per capita income, and those with declines in both variables. The largest and most diversified 
countries in the region, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, are in the second group. By contrast, most of 
the countries in the third quadrant, the unsuccessful cases, are small and less diversified both in 
natural endowments and exports. 
Ecuador, located hardly above the horizontal line in the second quadrant, is the closest point 
to the regional average. The countly performed better than other Andean (Venezuela, Bolivia and 
Peru) or Central American and Caribbean counties. Being a less extreme case with no dramatic crises 
or conflicts --like Peru or Guatemala-- the Ecuadorean experience can be a meaningful example of 
the economic, social and political problems of SAP and export promotion policies in small Latin 
American countries. 
Additionally, as Ecuador's social structure can be depicted as highly inegalitarian while its 
social record in poverty, employment and basic needs has been weak, the case can also be interesting 
for evaluating the effects of current development strategies under difficult social conditions.4 
(Appendix Table 5 contains basic social development indicators for Ecuador, Peru and Costa Rica). 
Finally, as Ecuador suddenly moved from an oil export boom in the 1 970s to a crisis in the 
1980s, the case can also be illustrative of Dutch disease problems. Other Latin American oil exporting 
countries experienced severe economic setbacks and social tensions as well. 
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT POLICIES IN ECUADOR: AN OVERVIEW5 
Ecuador experienced rapid economic growth during the 1 970s, when the country became an 
oil exporter. The domestic reinvestment of export earnings led to a rapid process of Import 
Substituting Industrialization (IS!) and agricultural modernization. Sectoral performance, however, 
was uneven. While manufacturing and construction expanded quickly, per capita agricultural 
To create four meaningful quadrants, the origin of the chart has been translated to P( 100,100). 
See Carlos Larrea, "The Mirage of Development: Oil, Employment and Poverty in Ecuador (1972-1990)." 
Ph.D. Dissertation, York University, 1992. 
The main sources about the Ecuadorean structural adjustment experience are Conaghan, De Janvrv et al, 
(}rindle and Thoumi, and Larrea. Primary information is mostly taken from the Central Bank of Ecuador and ECLAC. 
See: Cahterine Conaghan, "Business and the 'Boys': The Politics of Neoliberalism in the Central Andes," Latin American 
Research Review, vol 15, N.2 (1990); Alain de Janwy, Elisabeth Sadoulet and André Fargeix, Adjustment and Equity 
in Ecuador, Paris: OECD, 1991; Alain de Janviy et al., The Political Feasibility of Adjustment in Ecuador and 
Venezuela, Paris: OECD, 1993; Merilee Grindle and Francisco Thoumi, "Muddling Towards Adjustment: The Political 
Economy of Policy Change in Ecuador," in Anne Krueger and Robert Bates, eds., The Political Economy of Structural 
Adjustment, (London: Basil Blackwell, 1992); Larrea, "The Mirage of Development: Oil, Employment and Poverty in 
Ecuador (1972-1990)." 
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production stagnated. As a capital-and-import intensive growth model was adopted, development 
policies favored mostly the modern and urban sectors. In spite of rapid urbanization and the 
expansion of the state apparatus and middle classes, the trickle down effects of economic growth 
among popular sectors were weak, The adoption of capital intensive technologies led to a 
disappointing employment performance. In fact, between 1972 and 1980, the percentage of wage 
earners in the labour force declined in both the urban and rural sectors and severe structural 
unemployment persisted.6 In spite of significant achievements in education and health, poverty and 
basic needs deprivation continued to be widespread.7 During the late 1970s, as oil exports stagnated, 
growth was achieved at the cost of foreign borrowing. As the external situation deteriorated, growth 
strategies became unsustainable and the ISI growth model collapsed when the Latin American debt 
crisis exploded. To make things worse, Ecuador was hit by two natural disasters in the I 980s -- 
coastal floods in 1983 and a major earthquake in 1987. Tables 2 and 3, and Appendix Tables I and 
2 present basic economic information of Ecuador for the period 1965-1994. 
Ecuador implemented structural adjustment policies from 1981 onwards. Generally the 
process can be characterized as gradual, slow, highly conflictive, selective, and still incomplete. 
The achievements of a decade of stabilization and adjustment are disappointing. In contrast to many other 
Latin American countries, hyper-inflation, social violence, and a return to authoritarianism have all been 
avoided, yet neither complete stabilization nor the restoration of growth per capita has been achieved.8 
Ecuador has had five presidents since 1981. Their political positions varied from conservative 
to social democratic. All of them tried to carry out stabilization programs, with different intensities 
and priorities. However, none was able to enjoy stable support from the legislature and chronic 
conflict prevailed. 
The [theni ten year sequence of policy reforms resulted in an overall inadequate performance for 
stabilization and adjustment for the following reasons: policy initiatives generally were introduced by the 
executive, only to be atrophied severe political opposition: the policies introduced were highly unstable; 
and many of those policies unleashed severe conflicts that led to costly policy enforcement or to equally 
costly policy reversal.9 
In contrast to countries where "shock" adjustment prevailed, as in Bolivia in 1985, the 
process has been slow and lengthy in Ecuador. Social conflict resulted in frequent setbacks and a 
stable political consensus on economic policies was never reached. 
6According to census information, the percentages of wage earners in the labour force declined in the urban 
sector from 67.2% in 1974 to 657% in 1982, and from 40.1% to 38.5% in the country side. The figures reveal also a 
reduced diffusion of wage relations, and hence a important underemployment problem. 
See Larrea, "The mirage of Development: Oil Employment and Poverty in Ecuador (1972-1990)". 




BASIC ECONOMIC DATA ON ECUADOR: 1965-1994 
(1975 sucres) 
Year Population GDP Per Capita GDP Exports Imports Gross XIGDP MIGDP I/GDP Inflation 
(000s) (1975 SI.) (1980US$) Investment (%) (%) (%) Rate (%) 
1965 4934.4 50706 10276.1 8162 12443 9852 16.1 24.5 19.4 
1966 5089.7 51945 10205.9 8379 13115 10057 16.1 25.2 19.4 3.7 
1967 5249.9 55512 10573.9 8742 14905 11692 15.7 26.9 21.1 4.8 
1968 5415.1 57749 10664.4 9233 17047 12087 16.0 29.5 20.9 3.1 
1969 5585.6 59096 10580.1 7860 16263 13033 13.3 27.5 22.1 5.1 
1970 5761.4 62912 10919.6 824.0 8333 17038 13576 13,2 27.1 21.6 5.4 
1971 5942.7 66852 11249.4 9293 20555 17190 13.9 30.7 25.7 9,7 
1972 6129.8 76493 12479.0 18294 19911 14102 23.9 26.0 18.4 7.4 
1973 6322.7 95867 15162.4 32370 20969 15952 33,8 21.9 16.6 12.1 
1974 6521.7 102046 15647.1 30837 30189 20194 30.2 29.6 19.8 23.9 
1975 6686.3 107740 16113.5 28242 35221 24907 26.2 32.7 23.1 13.2 
1976 6855.1 117679 17166.7 30629 34155 25268 26.0 29.0 21.5 10.2 
1977 7028.1 125369 17838.3 29095 40175 29181 23.2 32.0 23.3 12.9 
1978 7205.5 133632 18545.9 30032 41518 33058 22.5 31.1 24.7 13.1 
1979 7387.3 140718 19048.5 31534 41485 32955 22.4 29.5 23.4 10.1 
1980 7573.8 147622 19491.1 1443.2 30792 45683 34975 20.9 30.9 23.7 12.8 
1981 7765.0 153443 19760.9 32247 41453 32442 21.0 27.0 21.1 14.7 
1982 7961.0 155265 19503.3 1442.9 30647 44300 32667 19.7 28.5 21.0 14,7 
1983 8142.0 150885 18531.7 31396 33418 24127 20.8 22.1 16.0 48.1 
1984 8327.1 157226 18881.2 35331 32613 23035 22.5 20.7 14.7 30.4 
1985 8516.5 164054 19263.1 1396.4 39562 35000 24564 24.1 21.3 15.0 28.0 
1986 8710.2 169136 19418.2 1401.5 42944 34925 25677 25.4 20.6 15.2 23.0 
1987 8908.2 159016 17850.5 1301.2 36027 40286 26800 22.7 25.3 16.9 30.4 
1988 9110.8 175742 19289.4 1381.7 47235 36243 25465 26.9 20.6 14.5 57.9 
1989 9318.0 176195 18909.1 1351.6 46440 38106 25251 26.4 21.6 14.3 75.4 
1990 9529.9 181531 19048.6 1347.4 51159 36692 23961 28.2 20.2 13.2 48.5 
1991 9746.6 190384 19533.4 1381.4 56523 42551 26295 29.7 22.4 13.8 48.7 
1992 9968.2 197017 19764.5 1396.4 61940 42984 28523 31,4 21.8 14.5 54.6 
1993 10194.9 201447 19759.6 1395.8 64552 43309 45.0 
1994 10426.7 1419.5 27.3 
Sources: INEC, Censos de Población (1962, 1974, 1982 and 1990); Banco Central dcl Ecuador, Cuentas Nacionales (several issues); 
ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean (several issues). 
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TABLE 3 
ECUADOR: BASIC EXTERNAL SECTOR INDICATORS (1965-1994) 
(MILLION USS) 
Year GDP Exports Imports Foreign Terms of Oil Real Export Import 
Debt Trade Prices Purchasing Capacity 
(1970=100)(1972 US$)Power (1975 US$) 
(1975 US$) 
1965 1151 134 170.8 90.8 274.0 
1966 1255 148 171.9 105.4 299.3 
1967 1402 166 214.2 97.2 332.0 
1968 1523 177 255.5 92.7 354.0 
1969 1675 152 241.8 93.4 300.7 
1970 1629 190 273.8 242 100.0 345.8 466 
1971 1602 199 340.1 261 93.6 344.9 478 
1972 1874 326 318.6 344 84.3 2,4 520.5 611 
1973 2489 532 397.3 380 92.4 3.4 728.0 661 
1974 3711 1124 678.2 410 192.0 9.4 1262.8 1111 
1975 4310 974 987.0 513 159.0 7.4 974.0 920 
1976 5317 1258 958.3 693 179.3 7.5 1251.1 1222 
1977 6655 1436 1188.5 1264 194.8 7.4 1317.4 1357 
1978 7654 1557 1505.1 2975 172.8 6.3 1245.6 1368 
1979 9359 2104 1599.7 3554 210.5 10.1 1471.3 1473 
1980 11733 2481 2253.3 4601 236.1 14.0 1570.3 1561 
1981 13946 2168 1920.6 5868 235.2 14.6 1459.7 1391 
1982 13354 2237 2424.6 6633 231.1 14.0 1538.9 1188 
1983 11114 2226 1474.6 7381 191.0 12.4 1583.0 969 
1984 11510 2620 1630.0 7596 216.7 12.6 1928.2 1168 
1985 11890 2905 1766.7 8111 269.2 11.9 2137.9 1221 
1986 10515 2186 1810.2 9080 165.0 4.9 1343.2 866 
1987 9450 1928 2158.1 10217 202.3 4.9 1051.9 1073 
1988 9129 2193 1713.5 10754 178.3 4.0 1119.3 799 
1989 9714 2354 1854.8 11039 194.5 5.2 1211.3 1068 
1990 10569 2714 1861.7 11700 184.2 5.9 1263.0 983 
1991 11554 2851 2398.6 12271 155.4 4.8 1336.6 1111 
1992 12483 3008 2430.4 12122 151.3 4.8 1369.6 933 
1993 3062 2562.2 12806 4.2 1414.6 
1994 3717 3642.2 13664 4.0 1742.6 
Notes: Oil real and export purchasing \vere estimated by deflating oil current psices and current exports by the UN puce index of manufactures exported 
by des*ped countries. Tunus of trade taken inxn ECLAC estimates, defined as the quotient of the Paasche unit value indices for exports and imports, both referring 
to the same base. 
Sources: Banco Central dcl Ecuador, Cuentas Nadonales (several issues); Banco Central del Ecuador, Boletin Anuano (several issues): ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook 
for Latin AmerIca and the Caribbean (several issues); United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (several iaaucs). 
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In addition to the expected opposition to SAP policies from popular sectors and the middle 
classes, interest groups from dominant classes frequently resisted adjustment policies, when their 
specific interests were threatened. As a result, policies such as reduction of state subsidies and import 
duties became highly conflictive, and were implemented slowly and painfully. 
Opposition to structural adjustment from popular sectors and left wing organizations included 
several national strikes from organized labour, bus and truck driver strikes, frequent riots organized 
by students and informal workers, an incipient urban guerrilla activity in the mid I 980s, and the 
emergence of a powerful indigenous movement that paralyzed the country for one week in 1990. 
Government repression was violent, particularly during the conservative Febres Cordero 
administration (1984-1988), when human rights violations, including torture, assassinations and illegal 
detentions became frequent. As influential groups from dominant classes and right wing political 
parties were also involved in opposition to particular adjustment policies, conflicts between the 
executive and the parliament were frequent. During the Febres Cordero regime, the government 
response included the use of tear gas inside the congress chamber, and a military blockade of the 
Supreme Court. Other political events, like the kidnaping of the president by a group of paratroopers 
in 1987, are illustrative of the underlying chronic political conflict that prevailed since 1982. 
Thus SAP were applied in the midst of chronic social conflict. Additionally, they were 
implemented in a selective way. Only measures that did not confront strong opposition from 
influential groups among dominant classes were easily adopted. Among them, interest and exchange 
rate liberalization can be mentioned. These policies were received as either favourable or at least 
acceptable by agro-export elites. Conversely, reduction of protection for manufactures and domestic 
subsidies --particularly in oil derivatives and wheat-- generated strong resistance from industrialists 
and urban middle and subordinate classes. As a consequence, adjustment policies became notable for 
their lack of consistency, credibility and stability. The chaotic and spasmodic evolution of domestic 
oil-derivative prices is an illustrative example. 
Despite its instability, SAP implementation speeded up and became more consistent from 
1988 onwards, at least partially as a result of a more effective and stronger influence from 
international financial institutions, as Bargara Stalings suggests.'° Among the most important events 
in SAP application, the following can be mentioned. Exchange rate liberalization was quickly adopted 
in the early 1980s. In 1982, the Christian Democratic president Oswaldo Hurtado devalued the 
currency for the first time in more than a decade and the conservative government of Leon Febres 
Cordero moved to a market controlled exchange rate in 1984. Interest rates were liberalized as well. 
Ever since, exchange rates have fluctuated according to market signals, with moderate Central Bank 
intervention. The anti-export bias that prevailed during the I 970s due to chronic overvaluation was 
eliminated or greatly reduced. Only from 1992 onwards, did anti-inflationary policies result in a new 
trend towards overvaluation. (Real effective exchange rate indices are presented in Table 4.) 
Stallmgs, "International Influence on Economic Policy: Debt, Stabilization and Structural Reform", in: 



















Note: REER indices are estimated as the average quotient of the real exchange rate (official principal) between the Ecuador's 
currency and the currencies of its main trading patterns weighted by the relative participation of each of these countries in 
Ecuador's exports. 
Source: CEPAL, Preliminary Overview of the Latin American and Caribbean Economy, 1994. 
Domestic price liberalization --particularly elimination of oil and food price subsidies-- was 
slowly adopted during the I 980s. Only from 1989 onwards oil subsidies were consistently reduced 
and eliminated. 
The reduction of the state apparatus was also continuous during the I 980s (excepting a right- 
wing "populist experience" between 1986 and 1988) and speeded up in the early 1990s. Between 
1982 and 1990, the share of public servants in the national labour force fell from 13.5% to I l.4%.h1 
Although import barriers were reduced since 1984, in 1998 tariffs were still high and disperse, 
fluctuating between 0 and 3 00%. Additionally, some import restrictions and prohibitions persisted. 
In 1990 the most important step towards trade liberalization was adopted. Import tariffs were 
reduced to a rank between 5 and 80% (with most products --except vehicles-- ranking between 5 and 
30%) and most import restrictions and prohibitions were lifted, As a result, a dramatic expansion of 
According to the 1990 census, the sectoral composition of labour was: agriculture 32%, manufacturing 12%, 
construction 6%, commerce, transportation and services 43%, and others 7%. 
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consumer goods imports took place. As Table 5 shows, they increased by a factor of 4.9 between 
1990 and 1994.12 Since 1994, as the Andean Pact reemerged in the framework of "open regionalism", 
TABLE 5 
iMPORTS AND IMPORT TARIFFS: 1975-1994 
Year Total Consumer Goods Collected Import Tariffs/Imports 
Imports Imports (%) 
(US$) (US$) 
1975 987.0 129.7 17.8 
1976 958.3 107.5 18.9 
1977 1188.5 142.7 22.2 
1978 1505.1 203.8 17.2 
1979 1599.7 208.1 17.0 
1980 2253.3 243.1 15.8 
1981 1920.6 200.3 15.0 
1982 2424.6 274.9 12.7 
1983 1474.6 183.3 14.7 
1984 1630.0 180.3 14.8 
1985 1766.7 152.5 15.9 
1986 1810.2 169.6 16.2 
1987 2158.1 208.4 10.5 
1988 1713.5 164.6 11.9 
1989 1854.8 184.4 10.8 
1990 1861.7 178.6 11.6 
1991 2398.6 254.8 6.0 
1992 2430.4 397.2 6.2 
1993 2562.2 585.0 n.a. 
1994 3642.2 860.1 n.a. 
Sources: Dc Janvry et al, The Political Feasisibility of Adjustment in Ecuador and Venezuela; Banco Central del Ecuador, 
Cuentas Nacionales (several issues); Banco Central del Ecuador, Boletin Anuario (several issues); Banco Central del 
Ecuador, Información Estadistica Mensual (several issues). 
Ecuador has participated in a free trade area with Colombia and Venezuela. As a consequence, intra- 
regional trade experienced a dramatic jump, as exports to the Andean region moved from 203.7 
million US$ in 1991 to 385.6 in 1994, and import expansion was even higher. 
were partially reduced during the Febres Cordero administration. However the 1987 import rise was 
mostly an effect of the oil pipeline and infrastructure reconstruction after the earthquake. 
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Labour deregulation was pursued continuously during the period, as minimum wages declined 
and labour legislation was reformed "to increase flexibility and eliminate rigidities unattractive to 
foreign investors."13 (See Chart 4 for real minimum urban wages.) 
The foreign debt was renegotiated in the framework of the Brady Plan in 1994. In spite of 
that, its amount --13.66 billion US$ in December 1994-- is still growing and remains higher than 
GDP. Ecuador's Debt/GDP ratio is one of the worst in Latin America. 
Despite its advance, structural adjustment remains an uncompleted task, as macroeconomic 
imbalances persist. Privatization of public enterprises is still on the agenda. Inflation, albeit declining, 
remains at around 20% per year. As the exchange rate has been used as an anchor to reduce inflation 
during the last years, the domestic currency has become overvalued. Interest rates are high and a 
massive inflow of speculative short term foreign capital poses doubts about the future stability of 
economic policies, as Mexico's recent crisis has demonstrated. As income taxes remained in 1993 at 
only 1.2% of GDP, fiscal reforms have not been successful in strengthening public revenues. 
Moreover, debt service will require around 7% of GDP in the near future. Finally, the recent border 
conflict with Peru will increase fiscal problems and reduce private credibility. 
ECUADOR'S ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: 1982-1994 
Broadly speaking, Ecuador's economic record from 1982 onwards is poor, in spite of a 
moderate recovery in the early 1990s. Only in 1992 did per capita income, in constant sucres, recover 
its pre-crisis level (1981). Measured in constant dollars, in 1994 it was still lower than the 1981 
figure. Both total and foreign investment rates remain low and flat, and the average export purchasing 
power in the 1990-1994 period was only 2.8 % higher than the 1976-1981 average. Moreover, no 
significant export diversification has taken place. Although exports jumped by 21% in 1994 --the 
highest expansion since the oil boom years-- its growth cannot be necessarily regarded as a sign of 
a stable future export expansion.'4 Nevertheless, in spite of its weak performance, the country did not 
experience hyper inflation, a dramatic income decline, or violent social unrest, as in the cases of Peru, 
Bolivia and other countries in the region. Charts 2, 3-A and 3-B present detailed information on the 
evolution of the economy and exports. 
Between 1983 and 1992, investment rates averaged 14.8% of GDP, down from a 21.5% 
13 
Dc Janviy et a!., The Political Feasibility of Adjustment in Ecuador and Venezuela, p. 79. 
14 
The export mcrease is partially explained by both a dramatic increase in coffee prices --a volatile event-- and 
the expansion of intia-regional exports to the recently open Andean Market. The latest can be regarded mostly as an static 
short term gain of free trade, and will probably follow a logistic trend and reach a ceiling level in the next years. Non 
traditional exports to developed countries performed well, but their current level is still low. In 1994, the three main non- 
traditional exports --flowers, textiles and wood products-- accounted for 1.5%, 1% and 0.5% of total exports. 
12 
mean for the 1965-1982 period.15 There is no sign of investment recovery, as the trend remains 
stagnant or declining. Foreign investment, in particular, never reached 1% of GDP after its peak in 
the 1967-1975 period, when the petroleum-export sector was established. Based on this performance, 
it is difficult to forecast a stable economic recovery in the short term. Nevertheless, growth in per 
capita income was slightly positive between 1989 and 1992, with an average of 1.5% per year. 
The adverse evolution of terms of trade has been a determinant factor in poor economic 
performance, particularly over the late I 980s, when oil, coffee and cacao prices plummeted, largely 
affecting export purchasing power. While export quantum grew at 6.3% per year between 1980 and 
1993, terms of trade worsened by 36% in the same period.'6 Although this problem is common in 
Latin America, Ecuador is among the most affected cases.'7 
Exports. As export promotion and diversification is one of the most important goals of 
structural adjustment, an analysis of export performance is important. The time that has elapsed is 
long enough for an evaluation since exchange rate liberalization and other export promotion policies 
have been pursued for more than a decade. As can be observed in Charts 3-A and 3-B, despite the 
exceptional expansion of 1994, export record has been weak and unstable. In most products, an 
important volume expansion has been outweighed by declining prices.'8 As a consequence, the 
average export purchasing power for the 1988-1994 period was 2.5 lower than that figure for 1976- 
1981. In per capita terms, the drop was Moreover, export purchasing power plummeted in 
1986 when oil prices collapsed, and the subsequent recovery has been weak up to 1993. Its annual 
growth rate was only 2.6% between 1989 and 1993, only slightly higher than the population growth 
rate (2.1%). The large 1994 recovery is partially explained by soaring coffee prices, the expansion 
of intra regional trade, and increasing oil export volumes, which can not be sustained in the medium 
term.2° Although a moderate export expansion is probable in the future, a sustained short term 
economic recovery based on solid export growth seems elusive. 
From 1972 onwards, four groups of products have accounted for the bulk of Ecuadorean 
During the oil boom period, private investment was not only restricted to petroleum activities, but covered also 
manufacturing and fmances. Public investment was also high, particularly in infrastructure. 
accounts for a significant share in export quantum 
17Latin American terms of trade deteriorated by 33% between 1980 and 1993. See ECLAC, Statistical 
Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, 1994. 
18 Oil is an illustrative example. Oil exports strongly expanded in the early I 980s, but the price drop in 1986 
outstripped the growth. See Chart 3-A. 
'9Export purchasing power was calculated by deflating current exports by the U.N. price index of manufactures 
exported by developed countries. See United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (several issues). 
oil reserves will allow for about twelve more years of exports, with declining volumes and quality, and 
higher extraction costs. oil prevails in unexploited reserves. See World Bank, Ecuador -Country Economic 
Memorandum (1988). 
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exports. They are: crude oil and its derivatives; bananas; coffee and cacao beans and their elaborates; 
and fishery products (mostly shrimp). To evaluate exports, I did a comparative analysis of export 
performance between the 1970-1982 and the 1982-1994 periods, using a time series intervention 
analysis of the of export purchasing power for total exports and the main products. 1982 was chosen 
as a turning point between the oil boom and the crisis periods, given the significant change in long 
term trends in per capita GDP and import capacity.2' Comparing the 1970-198! and 1982-1992 
periods with kinked exponential trend models, per capita GDP growth rates went down from 5.3% 
to -0.5% between the two periods, and import capacity did so from 9.7%to During the 
1970-82 period Ecuador followed ISI policies and then moved towards an export promotion strategy 
after 1982. To the effects of changes, I included two variables: a dummy variable for the 
1982-1993 period, to capture a realignment of the export levels, and an interaction variable, to 
capture the change in the export growth rate during the post-1982 period.23 In this way the effects 
of the post-1982 period are decomposed into: (i) an initial one-step change, and (ii) a variation in the 
growth rate. The results are summarized in Table 6. 
Only for banana exports was the growth rate higher after 1982 than for the first period 
(judged by statistical significance). In the case of non-traditional products (other exports in the table) 
the change was positive, but not statistically significant. Changes in growth rates were negative, and 
in most cases significantly, for all the remaining cases. According to a similar model presented by the 
author in a previous research, which included the evolution of export quantum up to 1991, a positive 
and statistically significant difference in export volumes was found for total exports, oil and bananas.24 
Therefore, Ecuador's export performance can be depicted by an important, albeit unsuccessful, 
volume expansion. 
The large expansion in banana exports during the late I 980s, and the more recent decline, are 
mostly the effects of changes in international demand: a shift of consumer preferences from processed 
to fresh fruits in the first case and the protectionist policy applied for the European Union in the 
second. Ecuador's participation in banana markets did not change significantly. 
21 Import capacity, defined as the total purchasing power to import, was obtained by adding net capital and 
service flows to values of current exports, and deflating the total by the UN index of prices of manufactures exported by 
developed countries. 
22 Conelation coefficients were 0.96 for per capita GDP (measured in constant sucres) and 0,83 for import 
capacity. See Tables 2 and 3 for data. See, as a reference for kinked exponential models: James Boyce,"Kinked Exponential 
Models for Growth Rate Estimation", Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 48, No. 4, November 1986. 
23 The interaction variable equals 0 for the 1970-1981 period, and 1 for 1982, and then, increases 1 unit for each 
subsequent year of the post-1982 period. 
24 See Lanes, "The Mirage of Development: Oil, Employment and Poverty in Ecuador (1972-1990)." 
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CHART 2 
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CHART 3-A 
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Note: Export purchasing power was calculated by deflating current exports by the United Nations price index of exports of 
manufacthres from developed countries. 
Sources: Banco Central del Ecuador, Cuentas Nacionales (several issues); Banco Central del Ecuador, Boletin Anuario 
(several issues). 
Export diversification has also been weak. The most important non-traditional product 
exported to developed countries is fresh flowers, at US$ 54 million in 1994. Despite their rapid 
growth, flowers accounted for only 1.47% of total exports in that year. Moreover, Ecuador's exports 
are still overwhelmingly composed of primary or slightly elaborated products. According to ECLAC, 
93% of Ecuadorean exports in 1993 were primary products. The recent opening of the Andean 
market produced an important growth in intra-regional exports, including manufactures. However, 
after the achievement of static gains from free trade, further growth will probably decline. 
To summarize, Ecuador's export earnings have been dramatically affected by declining terms 
of trade since 1982. In spite of quantum expansion, purchasing power remains low. Excepting 1994, 
growth rates have been scarcely higher than those of the population. Export diversification also has 
been weak. So far, structural adjustment and export promotion policies have been unable to reactivate 
exports and resume strong economic growth. The remarkable 1994 expansion does not seem to be 
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COMPARATWE PERFORMANCE OF ECUADOREAN EXPORTS 
1970-1982 AND 1982-1994 PERIODS 
(RESULTS OF INTERVENTION ANALYSIS) 
Product Growth Rate Post 1982 Retative Growth Rate Growth Rate Change 
or Group 1970-1981 (1) Realignment 1982-1993 
(Annual %) (%) Significance (Annual %) Sign Significance 
Total Exports 10.7 -6.9 No -1.2 - Yes 
Oil and 
Derivatives 20.9 -1.3 No -7.0 - Yes 
Non-oil 
Exports 6.1 -29.6 Yes 5.4 - No 
Bananas -2.5 -28.8 Yes 11.5 + Yes 
Coffee, Cacao 
and Elaborates 7.7 -18.6 No -5.3 - Yes 
Fishery 
Products 18.6 37.3 No 7.1 - Yes 
Other 
Exports 6.3 -57.8 Yes 10.0 + No 
Sources: Banco Central dcl Ecuador, Boletin Anuario (several United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (several 
issues). 
Notes: Growth rates are estimated from exponential regressions, corrected for first-order autocorrelation. 
(1) For total exports and oil and derivatives, the period is 1972-1981. 
(2) Statistical significance is tested at the 5% level. 
SOCIAL EFFECTS OF THE CRISIS AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 
Available information --albeit incomplete and not completely reliable-- suggests that social 
conditions in Ecuador worsened during the post-1982 period. Income distribution became more 
concentrated, urban poverty increased, underemployment and unemployment went up, real wages 
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declined and public social services deteriorated. Although some recovery is evident in the last few 
years, its future strength and sustainability are still unclear. Labour market conditions changed as well, 
as educational returns declined for low educational levels, and wage dispersion increased, both among 
and within groups with the same education, experience and gender, and in the same sector25. Social 
transformations are analyzed below, with emphasis on the urban sector during the 1987-1993 period, 
for which a detailed household survey information is available. 
I will begin by summarizing relevant information available for the 1982-1993 period as a 
whole, or most of it. Table 7 contains figures on state expenditure, relative to GDP. Between 1982 
and 1992, the share of public expenditure in GDP dropped by almost a half. Public consumption and 
social services (education and health) have been particularly hard hit. The reduction of the public 
bureaucracy is still under way and speeded up after 1992. The reduction of public expenditure, 
however, was not homogeneous. During the Febres Cordero conservative administration (1984-1988) 
cuts affected mostly social services, while the rest of public expenditure was not severely affected. 
By contrast, the social democratic regime of Borja (1988-1992) reduced mostly public investment 
and other components of public expenditure, without affecting social services in the same way. 
In a context of educational budget cuts and shrinking family incomes, gross enrolment rates 
in secondary and tertiary education declined or leveled off, reversing their long term expansion, and 
the remarkable improvement during the oil boom period (see Table 8).26 Surprisingly, the average 
education of urban wage earners remained roughly constant between 1987-1988 and 199327 Since 
the quality of education seems to be declining as well, human capital formation has been seriously 
prejudiced, affecting long term prospects for economic recovery. 
Wage policies, mostly wage repression and labour market deregulation, resulted in a strong 
decline in real minimum wages, as Chart 4 shows. Labour costs in constant dollars followed a similar 
path28. Although information on average wages is only partially available,, the evolution of functional 
income distribution shows a strong decline in the share of wages in value added (Chart 4), from about 
30% during the I 970s to less than 15% in the early I 990s. 
25 Four labour market sectors are differentiated: modern, miormal, agricultural, and domestic services. 
Additionally, the pnvate-public sector dichotomy was included. 
26 The unusual expansion of tertiary enrolment in the I 970s was a result of both the elimination of admission 
exams in public universities since 1969, and a strong support to higher education during the oil boom. Nevertheless, the 
1980 figure for tertiary education in Table 8 may be slightly overestimated, due to possible over reporting of students form 
universities for budgetary reasons. 
27 
The mean of years of formal education among urban wage earners is 9.8 for the whole urban sector, and 10.2 
for Quito and Guayaquil, the two largest cities. 
28 Although measurement in constant dollars is not a relevant estimation of real wages, given the changes in real 
effective exchange rates and terms of trade, it provides an indicator of international competitiveness, as the country exports 
labour intensive products. 
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The evolution of total wages and business income, broken down by main economic sectors, 
provides a closer look at social income distribution (See Tables 9-A and 9-B). The information 
analyzed here updates and summarizes the analysis from De Janvry et al.29 Between 1982 and 1992, 
the total wage bill declined by 43.4% in real terms. The reduction was less severe in agriculture 
(24.6%), and affected mostly manufacturing labour, which lost 60.9% of its value. Losses among 
public servants (33.6%) and other urban workers (46. 1°/o) were in between. As unions are 
concentrated in manufacturing, the information suggests that organized labour was the most affected 
social group. 
TABLE 7 
PUBLIC SECTOR CONSUMPTION, INVESTMENT AND EXPENDITURE: 1980-1993 
(Percentages of GDP at current prices) 
YEAR PUBLIC PUBLIC TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN: 
CONSUMPTION INVESTMENT EXPENDITURE EDUCATIONHEALThOTHER 
1980 14.5 6.4 20.9 5.3 1.8 13.8 
1981 14.3 7.3 21.6 
1982 14.0 6.5 20.5 5.1 2.2 13.2 
1983 12.5 4.8 17.3 
1984 12.3 4.4 16.6 
1985 11.5 4.9 16.3 3.7 1.1 11.5 
1986 12.1 6.0 18.0 4.0 1.1 12.9 
1987 12.8 6.4 19.3 3.9 1.4 14.0 
1988 11.5 16.9 3.3 1.3 12.3 
1989 9.4 4.6 14.0 3.0 1.2 9.8 
1990 8.6 4.0 12.6 2.7 1.2 8.7 
1991 7.7 3.9 11.5 2.9 0.9 7.7 
1992 7.2 3.9 11.0 3.1 1.0 6.9 
1993 2.7 0.7 
Sources: ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean (1993); Banco Central del Eenador, Cuentas 
Nacionales (several issues); Banco Central del Ecuador, Informaclén EstadIstica Mensual (several issues). 
During the 1982-1992 decade, a substantial income transfer from labour to capital took place. 
Among capitalist classes, landowners (and farmers) were particularly benefitted during the 1982- 
1986 period, when a strong devaluation took place, favoring agricultural and fishing exports. Real 
business income from agricultural and fishing went up by 46.5% in four years. The close links 
29 
See De et al., The Political Feasibility of Adjustment in Ecuador and Venezuela. 
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between the president Febres Cordero and the nation's agro-export elites partly explain this result. 
From 1988 to 1992, when the social democrat Rodrigo Borja took office, income transfers primarily 
benefited the manufacturing elites, which increased their income at 7.6% per year, mostly at a Cost 
of labour. 
TABLE 8 
GROSS ENROLMENT RATES BY EDUCATION LEVEL: 1970-1990 
(PERCENTAGES) 
Year 1970 1975 1980 1982 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Secondary 26.2 40.2 52.9 53.5 57.1 57.4 56.0 56.2 53.4 55.7 
Tertiary 8.1 27.1 37.2 29.4 26.4 20.7 21.1 
Note: The 1980 figure for tertiar education may be slightly overestimated, given a possible over reportmg of enrolment from 
universities for budgetary reasons. 
Source: ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean (1993). 
In a context of slow economic growth and falling wages, important changes took place in the 
labour force structure.3° The two most important transformations were: first, a large reduction in the 
percentage of wage earners, which took place in both the urban and rural sectors. According to 
census information, between 1982 and 1990, the figure declined from 65.7% to 55.7% in the urban 
sector, and from 38.5% to 33.7% in the countryside. At the national level, the decline was from 
52.6% to 45.9%. This change suggests an expansion of the relative importance of both the urban 
informal sector and peasant subsistence economies. As large labour surplus exists in both sectors, 
structural unemployment grew. It must be added that Ecuador has been one of the countries with 
highest underemployment rates in Latin America. According to PREALC, underemployment affected 
62% of labour force in 
The second transformation is a strong increase in participation rates, particularly among 
females. Global participation rates went up from 45.3% to 50.7% for the total population, and from 
30 
See for a detailed analysis, Larrea, "The Mirage of Development: Oil, Employment and Poverty in Ecuador 
(1972-1990)." 
31 PREALC identifies as a "proxy" underemployed workers "with those employed in the traditional rural sector 
and the urban informal sector". See PREALC, Beyond the Crisis (Santiago: ILO, 1985). 
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18.3% to 26.3% among women.32 The information suggests that the expansion was a subsistence 
strategy of poor families in the face of shrinking incomes.33 This behavior follows a backward- 
bending labour supply curve, as Rocha found in Brazil.34 
Although information on rural social conditions is scarce and fragmentary, national accounts 
data suggests a decline in the total agricultural wage bill (see Tables 9-A and 9-B). A 1994 survey 
carried out by IICA in several regions of the country discloses two dominant trends in rural wage 
employment: first, a reduction in the percentages of wage earners (with the only exception of new 
areas of flower production), and second, a move from permanent to temporary employment.35 
Additionally, the crisis in the construction industry reduces employment alternatives for rural 
seasonal and permanent migration to the cities.36 
In spite of the crisis, not all social indicators deteriorated. Infant mortality rates declined, as 
they did in all LAC countries. Social diffusion of technical progress in medical care, as well as better 
educational levels, seem to play a role in a general trend towards better health conditions, even under 
harsh social and economic situations. According to census data, between 1982 and 1990, illiteracy 
rates declined and the average educational level of the adult population increased by about one year. 
Housing conditions improved as well. These changes were probably a lagged effect of the social 
investment in education and health accomplished during the oil boom period. 
Recent Trends in Urban Income Distribution and Labour Conditions. Recent trends in 
urban social structure can be analyzed in detail, thanks to a series of urban household surveys 
available since Before analyzing the information, a comment on its reliability is necessary. 
Although household surveys are the most important empirical source on recent social trends in 
Ecuador, they have some problems. 
32 The global participation rate is defined as the ratio of EAP to population of work age. 
In addition, there is a long term trend to increase female participation in the labour force. 
See Cecilia Rocha, "The Market for Unskilled Labour in Brazil" (Ph.D. Dissertation. York University, 1987). 
IICA stands for Instituto Interamericano de Cooperacián Agropecuaria. See IICA-PRONADER, Encuesta de 
Base en 12 Areas de Desarrollo Rural (unpublished data base, 1994). 
36 Construction output declined from 4.7% of GDP in 1982 to 2.8% in 1991 (percentages arc estimated from data 
in constant 1975 sucres). See also: Simon Commander and Peter Peek, "Oil Exports, Agrarian Change and the Rural Labor 
Process: The Ecuadorian Sierra in the 1 970s," World Development, Vol.14, No. 1, 1986. 
Annual employment and income surveys are available since 1988 for the urban sector, and since 1987 for the 
three largest cities (Quito, Guayaquil and Cuenca). Since 1993, surveys are taken twice a year. 
23 
CHART 4 







Sources: Barico Central del Ecuador, Cuentas Naclonales (several issues); Banco Central del Ecuador, Boletmn Anuaiio 
(several issues); INEM, unpublished information; 1DB, Economic and Social Progress in Latin America (1994). 
A common problem in household surveys is income under-reporting.38 To estimate it, I 
compared total urban income with national accounts --excluding agriculture and petroleum-- 
differentiating labour and non-labour income, Wage under-reporting was relatively small, with an 
average of 5%. Conversely, non-labour income was under reported by 80%. In other words, only one 
fifth of non-labour income was reported. Under reporting coefficients remained roughly constant for 
the 1988-1993 period. As capital income is the largest component of GDP, the total under-reporting 
factor is 65%. These figures cast serious doubt on the reliability of the information. While wages seem 
to be well reported, capital income is mostly undetected. By adjusting capital incomes to equal the 
national accounts figure, a better estimation can be obtained, although evidently still open to possibly 
serious bias because any assumption about how much to adjust each family's capital income is 
arbitrary. Moreover, an estimation of urban income from published national accounts information is 
also affected by a wide error margin.39 
35 . . . Analyzing the 1975 survey in Ecuador, Berry found a serious under reportmg of capital income. Albert Berry, 
and the role of Intermediate Cities in Ecuador during the Coming Years" (Quito: USAID, unpublished 
paper, 1984). 
39 . . Total urban income in the household survey was adjusted to non-primary GDP. As agriculture output does not 
correspond to rural output, an estimation error exists. 
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The second problem is posed by frequent changes in the questionnaire. Income questions 
changed twice, in 1991 and 1992. The use of three different questionnaires seriously affects 
diachronic comparability. The 1991 survey in particular seems to be the less reliable in the series. 
Other changes in the sampling procedure and the institutional context seem less harmful. In 
conclusion, reporting and non-sampling flaws create systematic biases and other errors in the 
information, reducing data comparability and reliability; Adjustments can only partially compensate 
for those problems. 
Taking these problems into account, and trying to correct them when possible, five themes 
will be discussed: income distribution, poverty, labour force composition, wages, and returns to 
education. 
Income Distribution. Data on income distribution are presented in Tables 10 and 11. An 
increase in income concentration can be observed, both among income earners and households. The 
increase seems to be triggered around 1990, at the time of import liberalization. The Gini coefficient 
among earners went up from an average of 0.431 in 1988-1990 to an average of 0.483 in 1992- 
(Unfortunately, 1991 data are not reliable, due to the application of an oversimplified income 
questionnaire in that year, and there are changes in the questionnaire between the two intervals.) 
Household income distribution follows a similar, albeit smoother, ascending path. Concentration 
among households is, as expected, lower than that among earners. 
Given severe under-reporting, Gini coefficients calculated from reported income probably 
underestimate real figures. However, as relative under reporting factors remain roughly unchanged 
over time, the information bias is constant and the observed 5 percentage point increase in Gini 
coefficients can be regarded as an objective indicator of a significant process of income 
concentration.4' Moreover, as concentration is consistently shown in all the coefficients for specific 
40(iini coefficients were directly calculated from individual observations. Both persons and households with zero 
income were excluded. (ml coefficients were estimated ranking earners by personal income and households by household 
income. Questionnaires report monthly income, referred to the last month before the survey. For the 1989 and 1990 
surveys, missing values for non -waged income received in kind by employers and self-employed persons were estimated 
by a multiple regression. All other cases with missing values were excluded from the calculations for Gini coefficients 
among earners. In the case of households, only cases with missing family income were excluded, and individual missing 
values were not added to family income. Generally, the percentage of missing income in the surveys is below 2%, 
excepting the case of non-waged in-kind income in 1989 and 1990, where a regression estimation was used. 
Reporting rates, defmed as the ratio of total survey income to the correspondent national accounts figure, are 
the following: 
Year Wage Other Income Total Income 
1988 0.833 0.186 0.340 
1989 0.963 0.229 0,375 
1990 1.026 0.213 0.362 
1991 1.266 0.200 0.377 
1992 0.983 0.184 0.3 16 
25 
groups, and samples are very large, observed income concentration in the urban sector cannot be 
attributed solely as a result of statistical flaws, changing questionnaires or aleatory errors.42 
To estimate and correct the bias, reported income has been adjusted to national accounts, 
using specific correction factors for wage and non-wage income each year. The resulting Gini 
coefficients present an increment from 0.61 to 0.66 between the two intervals. Although the real value 
of Gini coefficients is difficult to determine, corrected figures are likely more representative. 
Comparison between the 1988-1993 period and previous years is difficult because of different 
samples, questionnaires and methods in household surveys. Only two previous estimates from urban 
household surveys exist, and uncorrected Gini coefficients for the employed population were 0.507 
in 1968 and 0.454 in 1975. From this information and other sources can be hypothetically inferred, 
therefore, that urban income distribution was very high before the oil boom, went down during the 
1970s --mostly as a result of a large expansion of middle classes during the boom-- and became more 
concentrated again during the crisis, which particularly affected middle classes and popular sectors.43 
National accounts figures also suggest that income concentration increased from 1983 onwards. The 
largest change, however, took place after 1990. Two important factors probably played a role in the 
recent process. Trade liberalization, on the one hand, may have adversely affected small scale 
production, given the dramatic expansion of consumer good imports, and also may have induced 
technological change. On the other hand, the reduction of public employment, which has accelerated 
after 1991, strongly affected the middle classes. The combined effect of those changes was an 
increase in open unemployment rates, which rose from 6.1% in 1989 to 8.9% in 1991, and an 
expansion of the informal sector, which increased from 39.4% to 41.3% of EAP between the cited 
years (see Table 15). Further research is necessary to analyze the causal links between economic 
policies, labour composition and income distribution. 
42 Household surveys typically melude about 9000 families, or 42000 persons. After selecting income earners and 
adjusting for the effect of differential relative weights, the equivalent sample size fluctuates about 6000. Although the 
questionnaire applied from 1988 to 1990 is different to the used in 1992 and 1993, the information shows internal 
consistency for all the variables presented in this essay and is also comparable with national accounts, as note 41 shows. 
43see Philip Musgrove, Consumer Behavior in Latin Amenca: Income and Spending of Families in Ten 
Andean Cities, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1978; Carlos Luzuriaga and Clarence Zuvekas, Income 
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acionales (several issues). 
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To the particular evolution of different kinds of income, I calculated Gini coefficients 
for wage and non-wage income, and for formal and non-formal activities.44 Concentration increased 
in all four groups, albeit in different degrees. The increment between the 1988-1990 and the 1992- 
1993 means is 3.3 percentage points for wages, 7.3 points for non-wage income, 9 points for the 
formal sector, and 4.6 points for non-formal activities. Data suggest that concentration took place 
mostly in business income. This change is consistent with a probable negative impact of trade 
liberalization on small-scale enterprises. However, wages became more concentrated as well. 
Additional empirical evidence suggests an increasing wage dispersion. Coefficients of variation of 
wages went up, and regression results (presented below) show that wage dispersion increased both 
among and within groups with similar education, experience, gender and sector. The change in non- 
formal income suggests that some informal activities are a non-regulated appendix of the modern 
sector. As Portes, Ong and others point out, new unregulated and flexible labour relations, such as 
subcontracting and small scale sweatshops, are increasingly adopted in both developed and 
underdeveloped countries.45 In this context, technological change, and production shifts (e.g. from 
non tradable to tradable activities) may have important effects on the informal sector as well. 
The evolution of real income for different strata, presented in Table 10, discloses a severe 
deterioration for the poorest half of the population, an unstable or slightly declining situation for the 
next 45%, and a well defined improvement for the richest 5%. In other words, real incomes 
deteriorated for subordinate and middle classes, while they increased for the highest echelons of the 
population. This evolution is consistent with national accounts information on social income 
distribution, presented in Tables 9-A and 9-B. 
Poverty. Following ECLAC's definition of the poverty line, I estimated poverty and indigence 
percentages, for both households and population.46 In addition, average per capita income was 
estimated in food-basket units for each group. Finally, I calculated a poverty gap index, defined as 
the fraction of poor population times the relative income gap (i.e. the relative difference between the 
Non-formal activities include the informal sector, domestic service and agricultural workers. The informal 
sector is heuristically defined as a group composed by: first, self-employed workers, excluding professionals and 
technicians with university education; second, unremunerated family workers; and, third, persons working in 
establishments with less than 6 workers, excepting activities such as travel, air transport and exchange agencies, or 
computer centers. Unremunerated family workers were included in all calculations referred to the informal sectors, 
excepting Gini coeficients. 
See David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, Cambridge: Blackwell, 1989; Oihwa Ong, Gender 
and Labor Politics of Postmodemity", Annual Review of Anthropology 20(1991); Alejandro Portes and Richard 
Schauffler, Informal Economy in Latin Amenca: Definition, Measurement, and Policies", PCID Working Paper 
Series N. 5 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1992). 
46 A household is defined as poor when its income falls below the cost of a basic consumer basket. A household 
is regarded as indigent when its income is lower than the cost of a normative basic food basket. The cost of the basic 
consumer basket is defined as 1.88 times the cost of the basic food basket. Following previous studies of poverty in 
Ecuador, an Engel coefficient of 1.88 is used, instead of its general value of 2. For 1990 and the following years, the cost of 
the food basket was estimated from empirical data collected in 1989 and food consumer price indices. See Carlos Larrea, 
Pobreza., Necesdades BIsieas y Desempleo: Area Urbana del Ecuador (Quito: ILDIS-INEM, 1990). 
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average income of the poor and the poverty line). The poverty gap index ranges between zero and 
one, and is somewhat simpler than Sen poverty index (See Table 12). 
TABLE 10 
URBAN INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN ECUADOR: 1988-1993 
GINI COEFFICIENTS 
Category 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Jul-93 Nov-93 
Income earners 
Households 
0.437 0.417 0.439 0.505 0.480 




Corrected 0.605 0.605 0.618 0.685 0.660 0.655 0.670 
Poorest 5 % 





Next 5 % 
Richest 5% 
(Richest 1 %) 
AVERAGE PERSONAL INCOME BY MAIN STRATA 
(1988 sucres/month) 









Average income 37827 36405 34583 34568 32456 34918 39436 
Sources: INEM and INEC. Encuesta de Hogares (unpublished data base, several years). 
(1) Personal income data were adjusted using correction factors to match total wages and total non-labour income with the corresponding 
components of non-primary GDP. Excluded primaiy activities were agriculture. silviculture, fishing, catering, logging, mining and 
petroleum extraction and refining. Correcting factors vaty for different kinds of non-labour income. 
Wages 0.377 0.373 0.409 0.433 0.394 0.399 0.423 
Non-wage income 0.509 0.458 0.467 0.574 0.555 0.544 0.555 
Formal Sector Income 0.536 0.565 0.597 0.65 0,645 0.643 0.686 
Non-formal income 0.417 0.398 0.393 0.46 0.452 0.438 0,458 
2345 2330 2006 1659 1753 1676 
4010 3859 3458 3042 2791 2933 
6998 5788 4876 4252 4057 4574 
11689 10266 9107 7720 8027 9044 
29341 29986 27851 20994 22308 24000 
65479 71208 67334 56552 55532 57754 
101906 103900 103266 91258 90876 98677 
257148 222508 216769 301498 252507 272148 
595397 414289 430563 728683 622503 601282 748098 
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TABLE 11 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION BY DECILES 
(Uncorrected Distribution among Earners) 
(Percentages) 
DECILE 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Jul-93 Nov-93 
1 1.4 1.8 1.8 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 
2 3.0 3.6 3.2 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.8 
3 4.4 4.6 4.3 3.4 3.8 3.9 3.6 
4 6.1 5.3 5.5 4.3 4.9 5.0 4.9 
5 6.6 7.0 6.3 5.9 6.3 6,1 5.6 
6 8.2 8.3 7.9 6.9 7.5 7.7 7.8 
7 9.5 9.9 9.7 8.9 9.1 9.3 8.4 
8 11,8 12.2 11.9 11.3 11.6 12.0 11.7 
9 15.5 15.3 16.0 15.2 15.2 15.4 14,6 
10 33.5 31.9 33.4 39.9 37.5 36.6 39.4 
(Top 5 %) 22.9 21.6 22.3 28.4 26.4 25.4 28.5 
(Top 1%) 8.9 7.7 8.4 12.5 11.9 10.6 12.4 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION BY DECILES 
(Distribution among Earners Corrected by National Accounts) 
(Percentages) 
DECILE 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Jul-93 Nov-93 
1 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 
2 1.9 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 
3 2.3 2.0 2.0 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.8 
4 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.3 
5 3.9 3.7 3.4 2.9 3.2 3.4 2.9 
6 5.0 5.0 4.9 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.1 
7 7.1 7.4 7.4 5.4 6.2 6,3 6.2 
8 11.2 12.3 11.9 8.8 10.1 10.0 9.8 
9 17.3 19.6 19.5 16.4 17.1 16.5 16.6 
10 47.5 44.8 46.3 56.8 52.9 53.1 54.5 
(TopS%) 34.0 30.6 31.3 43.6 38.9 39.0 40.8 
(Top 1%) 15.7 11.4 12.5 21.1 19.2 17.2 19.0 
Sources: INEM and INEC, Encuesta de Hogares (unpublished data base, several years). 
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TABLE 12 
URBAN POVERTY IN ECUADOR: 1988-1993 
Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Jun-1993Nov-1993 
Population Percentages 
Non-poor 33.7 29.3 24.7 26.7 26.2 26.5 31.9 
Poornon-mdigent 31.9 34.6 31.0 28.0 29.1 28.8 27.7 
Indigent 34.4 36.1 44.3 45.3 44.7 44.7 40.4 
Allpoor(PP) 66.3 70.7 75.3 73.3 73.8 73.5 68.1 
Household Percentages 
Non-poor 40.0 35.9 30.9 31.6 31.9 35.8 41,3 
Poor non-indigent 30.6 33.5 30.9 27.9 28.3 27.7 25.7 
Indigent 29.4 30.6 38.1 40.5 39.8 36.4 33.0 
All poor 60.0 64.1 69.1 68.4 68.1 64.2 58.7 
Per Capita income 
(basic consumer 
baskets) 1.223 0.942 0.855 0.936 0.904 0.936 1.090 
Non-poor 2.244 1.934 1.986 2.203 2.128 2.217 2.398 
Poor non-mdigent 0.746 0.736 0.732 0.734 0.725 0.732 0.739 
Indigent 0.328 0.335 0.309 0.317 0.303 0,307 0.293 
All poor (PY) 0.529 0.531 0.483 0.476 0.469 0.473 0.474 
Gap 
Index(PI)H 0.312 0.331 0.389 0.384 0.392 0.387 0.358 
Notes: (1) P1 PP (1-PY) / 100 
Sources: INEM and INEC. Encuesta de Hogares (unpublished data base. several years). 
Poverty percentages are likely overestimated, as a result of income under reporting, Corrected 
figures can be estimated to provide a more accurate view. In spite of the systematic bias, general 
trend can be observed. Poverty increased between 888 and 1992 and began to decline in 1993. As 
about two thirds of the population are affected, the incidence of urban poverty is stunning and much 
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higher than the regional average. 
The poverty trend follows the counter-cyclical behavior observed in other Latin American 
countries by Morley, increasing during recessions and declining as growth is resumed.47 In Ecuador, 
however, as income concentration did not decline, growth is still weak, and since an entirely new 
socio-economic context with weaker trickle down effects is being set up, poverty will likely remain 
at high levels in the near future. 
Wages. Wage trends are analyzed for the total urban sector, and for the two largest cities. 
Guayaquil and Quito are interesting no only because modern manufacturing and finances, and public 
sector employment are concentrated there, but also because the series for the two cities begins in 
1987, including one more year. Figures are presented in Tables 13 and 14. 
Average real wages plummeted from 1987-88 to 1992. The loss was 22% for the total urban 
sector between 1988 and 1992 and 32% for the two metropolitan centers in the 1987-1992 period. 
In 1993 a partial recovery took place, reducing the net loss by about a half Unfortunately, 1994 data 
are not yet available to find whether this wage recovery continued. Survey data corroborate general 
wage trends from national accounts, presented in Tables 9-A and 9-B. 
Total wage dispersion does not have a consistent trend. Nevertheless, the coefficient of 
variation jumps in the last survey, suggesting that recovery and increased heterogeneity are 
interlinked. Information from 1994 will also be important on this point. The increase of dispersion 
is concentrated in the formal sector of Guayaquil and Quito. It suggests the emergence of new highly 
profitable activities in the modern sector. They may be linked to finance, new technology (data 
processing, communications, biotechnology) or even narcotic smuggling. Further research is 
necessary to identify dynamic branches. 
Wage differentials between the formal and informal sectors are large and stable, suggesting 
a segmented labour market structure. Gender differences are also strong and consistent. As regression 
results --presented below-- show, significant gender discrimination exists in the labour market, as 
female wages are 23 % lower than male wages at equivalent levels of education, experience, and 
sectoral insertion. Labour market segmentation is also apparent form regression results, as informal 
activities have both lower wages at similar education and experience levels, and lower returns to 
education. Public servants were more affected by declining wages. For them, the drop was larger and 
the recovery smaller. 
See Samuel Morley, "Poverty and Distribution in Latin America: Evidence from the Past, Prospects for the 
Future"(paper prepared for the Seminar "El Impacto del Ajuste Estructural en los Mercados de Trabajo y en Ia 
Distribución del Irigreso en America Latina", University of Toronto and Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica, San José de 
Costa Rica, Septiembre de 1994. 
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TABLE 13 
REAL WAGES AND AVERAGE INCOME IN URBAN ECUADOR: 
1988-1993 (Thousand Nov-1988 sucres/month) 
Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Jul-93 Nov-93 
Mean Wage 37.9 32.2 31.4 30.8 29.6 31.7 34.7 
Mean Wage for: 
Modem Sector 44.8 36.9 36.8 36.8 34.9 37.8 41.7 
Informal Sector 23.4 20.8 20.0 22.4 18.9 18.5 21.7 
Agriculture 38.0 35.0 25.5 27.4 27.2 24.2 29.1 
Domestic Service 9.8 10.8 9.7 9.3 9.3 9.9 9.5 
Males 42.6 35.8 35.1 33.8 32.5 34.1 38.4 
Females 29.1 25.5 24.4 25.0 24.3 26.7 27.8 
PnvateSector 32.8 28.5 27.1 27.2 26.2 28.1 31.8 
Public Sector 50.1 40.9 41.7 41.2 39.1 42.0 44.4 
Wages/Totallncome 0.584 0.513 0.520 0.553 0.513 0.531 0.488 
Standard deviation 
of wages 40.5 31.6 38.3 37.1 30.9 32.4 48.2 
Coefficient of Variation 
of wages 1.07 0.98 1.22 1.21 1.05 1.02 1.39 
Non-wage income 
Mean 34.8 39.6 36.7 37.6 33.4 36.6 42.3 
StandardDeviation 52.4 46.7 42.5 72.1 60.7 62.6 72.4 
Coefficient of Variation 1.51 1.18 1.16 1.92 1.82 1.71 1.71 
Mean Total Income 
among Earners 37.8 36.4 34.6 34.6 32.5 34.9 39.4 
Note: Domestic service wages include only their monetary component. Additional in-kind remuneration has not been estimated. 
Sources: and INEC, Encuesta de Hogares (unpublished data base, several years). 
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TABLE 14 
REAL WAGES IN QUITO AND GUAYAQUIL: 1987-1993 
(Thousand Nov-I 988 sucres/month) 
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Jul-93 Nov-93 
Mean Wages: 
Total 48.4 42.3 35.2 35.1 34.2 33.0 36.1 40.8 
Modern Sector 55.3 48.4 39.6 40.1 39.2 37.8 41.4 47.3 
Informal Sector 31.1 25.2 21.7 20.7 25.9 20.3 19.8 24.4 
Agriculture 83.3 57.5 47.5 31.0 35.2 46.9 37.4 46.9 
DomesticServants 13.7 11.6 12.5 11.1 10.2 10.3 11.1 10.8 
Males 55.2 48.3 39.9 39.5 37.7 36.7 39.6 45.6 
Females 36.5 31.5 27.5 27.2 28.0 26.9 29.8 32.4 
PrivateSector 43.1 37.6 31.7 30.2 30.5 29.9 33.0 38.6 
Public Sector 64.8 55.8 45.0 48.2 46.4 43.7 47.5 49.2 
Wages/totalincome 0.611 0.613 0.553 0.591 0.623 0.578 0.564 0.544 
Standard deviation 
of wages 59.3 45.4 35.4 44.2 41.2 35.3 37.9 57.4 
Coefficient of Variation 
of wages 1.226 1.074 1.006 1.258 1.205 1.069 1.049 1.408 
Standard Deviation of Wages m: 
Formal Sector 65.0 48.9 37.3 48.6 45.4 37.8 40.7 63.9 
Informal Sector 21.2 19.2 14.7 13.0 28.8 17.0 15.6 20.4 
Coefficient of Variation of Wages in: 
FormalSector 1.177 1.011 0.941 1.210 1.156 1.000 0.982 1.350 
InformalSector 0.680 0.762 0.675 0.629 1.115 0.838 0.789 0.837 
Note: Domestic service wages include only their monetary component. Additional in-kind remuneration has not been estimated. 
Sources: INEM and INEC, Encuesta de Hogares (unpublished data base, several years). 
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TABLE 15 
URBAN LABOUR FORCE COMPOSITION: 1988-1993 
(Percentages) 
YEAR 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Jul-93 Nov-93 
Properly Employed Modem Sector 36.7 32.9 30.0 32.6 30.2 29.9 30.4 
Underemployed Modern Sector: 
-Invisible Underemployment 4.0 5.9 9.0 3.7 5.3 5.0 4.4 
-Visible Underemployment 2.7 3.6 1.4 1.7 1.3 2.4 2.2 
Unemployed: 
-Formerworkers 3.6 4.1 2.9 3.0 5.1 5.6 5.1 
-New workers 2.9 3.8 3.2 2.7 3.8 3.8 3.3 
Other (Ignored) Modem Sector 0.4 0.4 2.5 3.5 1.4 1,3 2.0 
Subtotal: Modem Sector 50.3 50.6 48.9 47.2 47.1 48.1 47.4 
Informal Sector 38.7 38.5 39.4 40.5 41.3 40.8 40.6 
Agriculture 5.8 6.4 6.4 7.0 6.0 6.3 6.7 
Domestic Servants 5.1 4.5 5.3 5.4 5.6 4.8 5.3 
Subtotal: Non-modem activities 49.7 49.4 51.1 52.8 52.9 51.9 52.6 
EAP 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Open unemployment rate 6.5 7.9 6.1 5.6 8.9 9.4 8.3 
Global Participation Rate among 
Persons Olderthan 12 Years 54.9 56.3 55.8 60.4 62.2 61.6 60.6 
Female Participation in EAP 36.0 37.5 36.8 39.3 40.5 38.2 39.7 
Note: A worker in the modem sector is properly employed when is not underemployed. Underemployment in the modem sector is 
hen a person works involuntarily less than fill time (40 hours week). A worker is affected by mvisible underemployment when works at 
least 40 hours/week, and his/her salary is below the legal minimum wage. 
Sources: INEM and rNEC. Encuesta de Hogares (unpublished data base, several years). 
Labour Force Composition. Several changes in labour structure can be mentioned. First, 
there is a non-reversed 6% reduction in the share of adequate employment in the modern sector 
between 1988 and 199348 The drop is mostly due to the contraction in public employment, coupled 
48 A worker in the formal sector has adequate employment when is not underemployed. See definitions in Table 
15. 
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with a stagnation in the modern private sector. As modern employment shrunk, open unemployment 
rates went up from 6.1% in 1989 to 9.4% in 1992 and 8.3% in 1993, and the share of the informal 
sector increased as well (See Tables 15 and 16). 
TABLE 16 
URBAN LABOUR FORCE COMPOSITION: 1988-1993 
MAIN SECTORS AND CATEGORIES 
(Percentages) 
YEAR 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Jul-93 Nov-93 
Mam Sectors 
Manufacturing 17.8 17.5 18.0 17.1 16.5 16.4 17.7 
Construction 7.4 7.0 7.4 6.8 6.8 6.3 6.2 
Tertiar Sector (excluding utilities) 67.7 67.8 66.2 67.4 69.0 69.2 67.4 
Occupational Categories 
Employers 7.9 7.5 4.9 6.0 7,8 8.4 7.8 
Self-employed 24.8 26.9 29.1 27.9 28.0 26.1 27.9 
Unremunerated Family Workers 3.9 4.2 6.4 5.9 6.7 7.4 6.1 
Public Servants 18.1 17.7 17.2 16.0 14.7 14.4 13.7 
Wage Earners in Private Sector 39.7 38.7 37.8 39.3 38.4 39.7 40.0 
Domestic Servants 5.6 5.0 4.6 4.9 4.4 3.9 4.6 
Subtotal: WageEarners 63.4 61.4 59.6 60.2 57.5 58.1 58.2 
EAP 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sources: INEM and INEC. Encuesta de Hogares (unpublished data base, several years). 
A second transformation is an increase in participation rates, particularly among females. 
There is a clear negative correlation between average wages and participation rates. As wages decline 
(increase), participation rates go up (down). As mentioned, this backward bending labour supply 
behavior seems to be a subsistence strategy adopted by poor families to face the crisis, and it has 
strong negative effects on educational enrolment. 
Third, percentages of wage earners present a declining trend, as both self-employed and non- 
remunerated family workers increase their shares. The change corroborates a strong pressure among 
poor families to "invent" secondary jobs, as labour conditions in formal markets deteriorate. 
No clear changes in the sectoral composition of labour were identified. Manufacturing 
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employment declined up to 1992 but recovered in 1993. This suggests the emergence of new dynamic 
activities, which may be oriented to the Andean or extra-regional markets. Further research is 
important to identify employment shifts in detail. 
The wage recovery in 1993 is not coupled with a reduction in income concentration. Neither 
an important improvement in underemployment or unemployment is observed. The evolution suggest 
that changes are not simply reversible movements associated with a recession-recovery cycle. 
Conversely, a new context with higher income concentration, an income transfer form labour to 
capital, and a different structure in the labour market seems to be emerging, as a result of trade 
liberalization, technological change and structural adjustment. 
Educational Returns. Labour market conditions are presumably affected by the rapid 
technological change which has been reshaping the world economy since the mid I 970s. In addition, 
internal factors like labour deregulation and a persistent and high inflation may have influenced labour 
market conditions.49 Trade liberalization and the recent currency overvaluation also probably helped 
to induce technological innovations, while negatively affecting traditional small scale production. 
As export expansion and diversification has been weak in Ecuador, the expected positive effects of 
export promotion among unskilled workers were probably small, particularly in the urban sector. 
To probe the impact of economic policies and new international conditions on the labour 
market, I elaborated a multiple regression model. The first version of the model was applied to wage 
earners in the urban sector from November 1888 to November 1993. A more specific model was used 
for wage earners in Guayaquil and Quito only, between 1987 and 1993. The dependent variable was 
monthly wages (in constant 1988 sucres), introduced in logarithmic form. 
The following independent variables were selected: 
* Years of formal education, included in quadratic fonn. 
* Years of experience, included in a cubic polynomial form. 
* Time in years (ranging from 0 to 5, for the 1988-1993 period, and from 0 to 6 for the 1987- 
1993 period). Time was included in quadratic form. 
* A dummy variable for female workers. 
* A dummy variable for informal workers (excluding agricultural workers and domestic 
servants). 
* A dummy variable for agricultural workers. 
* A dummy variable for domestic servants. 
* A dummy variable for public servants. 
* Several meaningful and statistically significant interactions between the above variables. 
Results of the two regressions are presented in Tables 17 and 18, Tables 19 and 20 contain 
49lnflation during the adjustment period, and particularly after 1986, has been unusually high in the Ecuadorean 
historical context. See Table 2. 
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wage regression estimates for the most important categories, and some relevant partial functions are 
plotted in Charts 5, 6, and 7. A simpler version of the model is presented in Appendix Table 4, to 
facilitate comparisons with results from other countries. Given the size of the sample, all variables 
have statistically significant coefficients. The following conclusions can be derived from the models: 
As mentioned earlier, there is a strong gender difference in wages, that suggest a 
discrimination against women. Other things being equal, female wages are about 22.6% lower than 
male wages. In the two main cities, were female participation is higher, modern activities are 
concentrated and poverty is lower, the difference is almost the same (20.5%). Separate regression 
results for each year show that there is no change in gender difference during the period. 
TABLE 17 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR TILE URBAN SECTOR 
Multiple R 
R Squared 
Adjusted R Squared 
Standard Error 
Dependent Variable: LOGWAG8 8 
Variables in the Equation 









































































































TABLE 17 (CONTINUATION) 
Meaning of variable names: 
LOGSAL88: Natural Logarithm of Wages (Nov—1988 sucres/month) 
EDUCFOR: Years of formal education. 
EDUCFOR2: EDUCFOR squared. 
EXPERIEN: Years of experience. 
EXPERIE2: EXPERIEN Squared. 
EXPERIE3: (EXPERIEN)3 
FEMALE: Dummy for females. 
INFORMAL: Dummy for informal sector. 
AGRICULT: Dummy for agricultural workers. 
DOMESTIC: Dummy for domestic servants. 
YEAR1: Year (1988=0) 
YEAR2: YEAR1 squared. 
YEAREDUC: (YEAR1) x (EDUCFOR) interaction. 
PUBLIC: Dummy for public servants. 
EDUCPUB: (PUBLIC) x (EDUCFOR) interaction. 
EDUC2PUB: (PUBLIC) x (EDUCFOR2) interaction. 
DOMEEDUC: (DOMESTIC) x (EDUCFOR) interaction. 
INFOEDUC: (INFORMAL) x (EDUCFOR) interaction. 
AGRIEDtJC: (AGRICULT) x (EDUCFOR) interaction. 
YEAREDU2: (YEAR1) x (EDUCFOR2) interaction. 
Note: Workers with very low wages (lower than 3000 sucres/month) and vely high estimated experience (greater than 70 years) 
were excluded from the regression. 
Sources: INEM and INEC, Encuesta de Hogares (unpublished data base, several years). 
Labour market segmentation is also apparent. Generally, non-formal workers have both lower 
wages and lower educational returns. As Chart 6 ant Tables 19 and 20 show, returns for primary 
education in the informal sector are low and present a declining trend over time, becoming negligible 
in Quito and (iuayaquil in 1993 (The primary instruction/no-education increment dived from 18.2% 
in 1987 to 3.6% in 1993). Domestic servants have a similar situation. In the case of urban agricultural 
workers, wages are 7.3% lower, but educational returns are even slightly higher than in the modern 
sector. 
Educational returns and wage differentials in the public sector are largely different from those 
of the modern private sector. Given the regulated labour conditions in the public sector, wages are 
higher for low educational levels, but educational returns are lower. As a result, for skilled labour, 
wages in the private sector are higher. (See Chart 6). 
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TABLE 18 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR QUITO AND GUAYAQUIL 
Multiple R 
R Squared 






Dependent Variable: LOGSAL8 8 
Variables in the Equation 






































































































TABLE 18 (CONTINUATION) 
Meaning of variable names: 
LOGSAL88: Natural Logarithm of Wages (Nov-1988 sucres/month) 
EDUCFOR: Years of formal education. 
EDUCFOR2: EDUCFOR squared. 
EXPERIEN: Years of experience. 
EXPERIE2: EXPERIEN Squared. 
EXPERIE3: (EXPERIEN) 
Dummy for females. 
Dummy for informal sector. 
AGRICULT: Dummy for agricultural workers. 
DOMESTIC: Dummy for domestic servants. 
YEAR1: Year (1987=0) 
YEAR2: YEAR1 squared. 
YEAREDUC: (YEAR1) x (EDUCFOR) interaction. 
YEAREDU2: (YEAR1) x (EDUCFOR2) interaction. 
YEA2EDU2: (YEAR2) x (EDUCFOR2) interaction. 
PUBLIC: Dummy for public servants. 
EDUCPUB: (PUBLIC) x (EDUCFOR) interaction. 
EDUC2PUB: (PUBLIC) x (EDUCFOR2) interaction. 
DOMEEDUC: (DOMESTIC) x (EDUCFOR) interaction. 
INFOEDUC: (INFORMAL) x (EDUCFOR) interaction. 
AGRIEDUC: (AGRICULT) x (EDUCFOR) interaction. 
Note: Workers with vety low wages (lower than 3000 sucres/month) and very high estimated experience (greater than 70 years) 
were excluded from the regression. 
Sources: INEM and NEC, Encuesta de Hogares (unpublished data base, several years). 
Broadly speaking, education presents increasing returns to scale. The wage-education 
function, other things being equal, is a positively concave parabola. However, the concavity of the 
curve changes both for different labour markets and over time. The wage-experience function, on the 
other hand, follows a third-degree polynomial. The wage-education-experience regression surface 
is plotted in Chart 7 for the year 1993. Its shape changes over time, and also for different sectors.5° 
50 All functions are analyzed and plotted in semi logarithmic scale. 
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TABLE 19 
WAGE REGRESSION ESTIMATES BY YEAR, CATEGORY AND EDUCATIONAL 
LEVEL (Thousand November-1988 sucres/month) 
TOTAL URBAN SECTOR 
YEAR 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
FORMAL SECTOR, MALES, PRIVATE SECTOR 
Noeducation 21.2 18.9 17.6 17.3 17.9 19.5 
Primary completed 28.3 24.7 22.6 21.8 22.1 23.5 
Secondary completed 44.2 38.6 35.5 34.2 34.7 37.1 
University completed 80.7 72.2 67.9 67.2 69.8 76.4 
INDICES 
University/Secondary 1.826 1.870 1,915 1.962 2.010 2.059 
University/Primary 2.850 2.925 3.002 3.082 3.163 3.246 
University/No education 3.805 3.828 3.851 3.874 3.897 3.921 
Primary/No education 1.335 1,309 1.283 1,257 1.232 1.208 
Secondary/No education 2.084 2.047 2.010 1.974 1.939 1.904 
FORMAL SECTOR, MALES, PUBLIC SECTOR 
No education 26.1 23.2 21.7 21.3 22.1 24.0 
Primary completed 34.2 29.8 27.3 26.3 26.7 28.4 
Secondary completed 46.6 40.7 37.4 36.1 36.6 39.1 
University Completed 66.3 59.3 55.8 55.1 57.3 62.7 
INDICES 
University/Secondary 1.422 1.456 1.492 1.528 1.565 1.603 
University/Primary 1.939 1.990 2.043 2.096 2.152 2.209 
University/No education 2.537 2.552 2.568 2.583 2.599 2.614 
Primary/No education 1.309 1.283 1.257 1.232 1.208 1.184 
Secondary/No education 1.785 1.753 1.721 1.691 1.660 1.631 
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TABLE 19 (CONTINUATION) 
YEAR 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
INFORMAL SECTOR, MALES 
Noeducation 19.1 17.0 15.9 15.6 16.1 17.5 
Primary completed 22.7 19.8 18.2 17.5 17.7 18 9 
Secondary completed 31.7 27.6 25.4 24.5 24.9 26.6 
University completed 51.5 46.1 43.4 42.9 44.6 48.8 
University/Secondary 1.628 1.667 1.708 1.750 1.792 1.836 
University/Primary 2.266 2.326 2.387 2.450 2.515 2.581 
University/No education 2.698 2.714 2.730 2.747 2.763 2,780 
Primary/No education 1.190 1.167 1.144 1.121 1.099 1.077 
Secondary/No education 1.657 1.628 1.598 1.570 1.542 1.514 
Notes: 
1) Female wage estimates are proportional and 22.6% lower. 
2) As professionals and technicians are excluded from the informal sector by definition, estimates for informal workers with 
completed university are included only to facilitate comparisons. Nevertheless, informal workers with uncompleted university 
have a slightly lower wage estimate. 
3) Estimates correspond to workers with average experience (17 years). 
Source: Table 17. 
Controlling for all other variables, wages declined from 1988 to 1991 and partially recovered 
in 1992 and 1993, following a positively concave parabolic trend. The evolution for Quito and 
Guayaquil is similar, beginning with a strong decline between 1987 and 1988. Not all wages, 
however, dropped in the same proportion. Generally, unskilled workers were the most affected, as 
both wages and educational returns dived for them. In fact, educational returns for unskilled 
(uneducated) labour declined dramatically, from 3.6% for year of education in 1988 to 0.9% 1993. 
In contrast with unskilled labor, educational returns for skilled workers (with tertiary education) 
increased over time. For the sixth year of university, they moved form 12% in 1988 to 15% in 
The ratio between educational returns of skilled labour and unskilled labour also increased over time. 
51 Educational return figures correspond to the modem sector. 
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TABLE 20 
WAGE REGRESSION ESTIMATES BY YEAR, CATEGORY AND EDUCATIONAL 
LEVEL (Thousand November-1988 sucres/month) 
QUITO AND GUAYAQULL 
YEAR 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
FORMAL SECTOR. MALES, PRIVATE SECTOR 
Noeducation 24.8 21.9 20.0 19.0 18.7 19.1 20.3 
Primary completed 33.1 28.2 25.0 23.2 22.4 22.5 23,6 
Secondary Completed 55.3 45.2 39.1 35.8 34.7 35.6 38.6 
University Completed 116.6 90.7 76.6 70.2 69.8 75.3 88.3 
University/Secondary 2.106 2.005 1.958 1.960 2.012 2.117 2.285 
University/Primary 3.528 3.222 3.062 3.030 3.121 3.345 3.733 
University/No education 4.703 4.148 3.828 3.696 3.732 3.943 4.358 
Primary/No education 1,333 1,288 1.250 1.220 1.196 1.179 1.167 
Secondary/No education 2.233 2.069 1.955 1.886 1.855 1.862 1.907 
FORMAL SECTOR, MALES, PUBLIC SECTOR 
No education 28.9 25.5 23.4 22.2 21.8 22.3 23.6 
Primary completed 40.4 34.4 30.6 28.3 27.4 27.5 28.9 
Secondary Completed 60.6 49.5 42.8 39.2 38.0 38.9 42.3 
University Completed 97.5 75.9 64.1 58.7 58,4 63.0 73.8 
INDICES 
University/Secondary 1.609 1.532 1.496 1.498 1.537 1.618 1.746 
University/Primary 2.413 2.203 2.094 2.072 2.134 2.288 2.553 
University/No education 3.370 2.973 2.743 2.648 2.674 2.826 3.123 
Primary/No education 1.397 1.349 1.310 1.278 1.253 1.235 1.223 
Secondary/No education 2.094 1.940 1.834 1.768 1.740 1.746 1.788 
45 
TABLE 20 (CONTINUATION) 
YEAR 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
INFORMAL SECTOR, MALES 
No education 23.3 20.5 18.8 17.8 17.6 18.0 19.0 
Primary completed 27.6 23.5 20.8 19.3 18.6 18.8 19.7 
Secondary Completed 40.9 33.5 28.9 26.5 25.7 26.3 28.6 
University Completed 76.5 59.5 50.2 46.0 45.8 49.4 57.9 
INDICES 
University/Secondary 1.868 1.779 1.737 1.738 1.785 1.878 2.027 
University/Primary 2.776 2.535 2.410 2.384 2.455 2.632 2.937 
University/No education 3.282 2.896 2.672 2.579 2.605 2.752 3.042 
Primary/No education 1.182 1.142 1.109 1.082 1.061 1.046 1.036 
Secondary/No education 1.757 1.628 1.539 1.484 1.460 1.465 1.500 
Notes: 
1) Female wage estimates are proportional and 20.5% lower. 
2) As professionals and technicians are excluded from the informal sector by definition, estimates for informal workers with 
completed umversity are included only to facthtate comparitiones. Nevertheless, mformal workers with uncompleted university 
have a slightly lower wage estimate. 
3) Estimates correspond to workers with average experience (17 years). 
Source: Table 18. 
The transformation in the wage-education function can be observed in Chart 5. The function 
in 1988 is scarcely concave. Between that year and 1993, two changes took place. First, wages 
declined, moving the curve downwards; and second, the concavity of the function increased, as 
educational returns dived for unskilled workers and rose for high educational levels. 
To analyze closely increasing returns to scale in education, I performed separate regressions 
for each year, with all the variables except time, The non-linear behavior of the function can be 
evaluated by the concavity of the wage-education function, which is the second partial derivative of 
wages with respect to education. Results are reported in Table 21, and regressions for each year are 
presented in Appendix Table 3 . Two main conclusions can be derived from the analysis. First, the 
concavity of the functions increases continuously and smoothly over time, between 1998 and 1993. 
Consequently, the transformation can likely be linked to a continuous process of technological 
change diffijsion, rather than being an effect of trade liberalization alone. Trade liberalization was 
implemented sharply in 1990-1991 and its effects on other variables, such as wages, Gini coefficients 
and unemployment rates, were also well defined over time. 
46 
CHART 5 
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Note: A male worker in the formal private sector with an average experience level is assumed. 
Source: Table 17. 
The regression for Quito and Guayaquil during the 1987-1993 period is similar, but 1987 
presents a particular characteristic, with a high concavity. It seems that the concavity in that year was 
high, declined later and became even higher during the 1990s. Although no evident interpretation of 
this particular evolution is presented here, it can be hypothetically assumed that the initial high 
concavity of the curve was due to a lasting effect of the labour market transformation experienced 
in the metropolitan centres during the oil boom years (1972-1982), when a extremely rapid expansion 
of skilled labour demand took place, while the supply evolution was delayed and frequently 
inappropriate, increasing educational returns for educated labour. As the secondary and university 
enrolment went up in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a massive flow of educated workers entered the 
labour market in the late 1 980s, when labour demand was affected by the economic crisis, flattering 
the wage-education curve. During the I 990s, as a result of technological change, trade liberalization 




Note: P.'stands for formal private. A male worker with an average experience is assumed. 
Source; Table 17. 
Finally, to measure wage dispersion within categories, I selected two indicators: the multiple 
correlation coefficients and the standard error of individual-year regressions. Information suggests, 
albeit not conclusively, an increasing wage dispersion within categories over time. 
Summarizing, a segmented labour market structure prevails in Ecuador, as the formal private, 
public and informal sector present particular traits, Gender differences are also high and stable. 
During the 1988-1993 period, as wages declined, educational returns changed, dropping for low 
educational levels and rising for skilled labour. Additionally, within-category wage dispersion seems 
to has rose as well. Thus wages feel and became more heterogeneous and concentrated. The 
transformation seems to be a complex result of different factors, such as technological change, trade 
liberalization, labour deregulation, low economic growth and weak export expansion. 











Note: A male worker in the private formal sector in 1993 is assumed. Natural logarithms are used in the wage Scale. 
Source: Table 17. 
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TABLE 21 
SELECFED COEFFICIENTS OF SEPARATED REGRESSIONS FOR EACH YEAR: 
1988-1993 (TOTAL URBAN POPULATION) 
Dependent Variable: LOG WAG88 (Natural Logarithm of monthly wages in constant Nov- 1988 sucres) 
Year Second Partial Derivative of Correlation Coefficient R Standard Error 
LOGWAG88 with respect to of Regression 
EDUCFOR 
1988 0.00328 0.688 0.547 
1989 0.00522 0.672 0.512 
1990 0.00676 0.652 0.555 
1991 0.00576 0.634 0.602 
1992 0.00680 0.657 0.573 
Jul-1993 0.00634 0.650 0.567 
Nov-1993 0.00792 0.658 0.597 
Sources: Appendix Table 3. 
CONCLUSIONS. 
Ecuador's economic record, during the post-1982 period, has been weak. Structural 
adjustment policies and export promotion strategies failed to strengthen exports and resume economic 
growth. From the political viewpoint, policy reforms have been adopted in a painful and conflictive 
way, without receiving a stable and coherent political support from the civil society. They even lacked 
a consensual support from dominant classes. As a result, policy reforms were applied in a midst of 
chronic political conflict, with poor economic coherence and political credibility. The reform-conflict- 
reversal cycle has prevailed in the country political scene for more than a decade. Nevertheless, the 
most important structural adjustment policies have been implemented and export promotion has been 
adopted as a long term development strategy. 
After twelve years of reforms, per capita income remains flat at about its pre-cnsis levels, 
investment/GDP ratios are still depressed, productive foreign investment has been scarce, and export 
performance is disappointing, albeit presenting signs of recovery. Moreover, inflation remains high, 
the foreign debt surpasses GDP and is still growing, fiscal revenues are weak, and the domestic 
currency is overvalued. 
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In spite of an important expansion in both oil and export volumes, export purchasing 
power remains depressed below its pre-crisis average. Moreover, export diversification has been 
weak, as non-traditional exports to developed countries account for less than 5% of total exports, 
and the country has been unable to significantly include manufactured products in its export basket. 
Although an explanation of the weak economic results of structural adjustment and export 
promotion in Ecuador remains beyond the objectives of this paper, some tentative and hypothetical 
factors can be mentioned. 
I will begin by analyzing common traits with other small Latin American countries. Even 
though Latin American manufactured exports expanded significantly from the early 1 980s onwards, 
this change has been uneven and concentrated in a particular group of countries, including the largest 
ones Mexico and Argentina) and Colombia. All of them have experienced long processes of 
import substituting industrialization since the 1930s, and had, at the early 1980s, medium or large 
internal markets, a long manufacturing tradition, a significant financial infrastructure, a significant 
human capital development, and other externalities. Conversely, most smaller countries presented 
weak installed manufacturing capacity and financial infrastructure, small and concentrated internal 
markets, low levels of education and human capital development, and less diversified natural resource 
endowments. 
As Buitelaar and Fuentes point out, export diversification has been limited in all small Latin 
American economies, with the only exception of Costa Rica.52 Exports from Ecuador, Bolivia and 
most Central American countries are still based on a small group of primary products. Manufactured 
exports are not large, and remain limited to traditional activities, such as textiles. Thus the capacity 
of Latin American countries to their exports and consolidate their insertion in international 
markets, upon export promotion strategies, is partially a function of both domestic market sizes 
achieved levels of development. The largest and most industrialized countries in the region have been 
able to take advantage of pre-existing scale economies, internal linkages, skilled labor, financial, 
institutions, physical infrastructure and other positive externalities derived from their import 
substitution phase of industrialization. Conversely, small and less diversified countries usually lack 
those acquired advantages, and present serious constraints to industrialization, such as lack of skilled 
labour and adequate financial institutions; limited energy and water supply, transportations systems 
and physical infrastructure; and reduced markets which do not allow to obtain scale economies. 
Therefore the availability of cheap unskilled labour is not a significant comparative advantage for 
export diversification, unless included in a wider set of features usually derived from a long 
manufacturing tradition. 
At the international level, rapid transformations have taken place in the world economy since 
the mid 1 970s, when the crisis of the Fordist regime of accumulation began. As a result of rapid 
technological change and the massive diffusion of information and communications technology, 
52 
See Rudolf Buitelaar and Juan Fuentes, "The Competitiveness of the Small Economies of the Region", 
CEPAL Review 43 (April 1991), 83-96. 
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biotechnology and other innovations, emerging technologies are less labour intensive, and save both 
energy and raw materials. The internationalization of production has led to a new international 
division of labour where traditional comparative advantages of small Latin American countries -- 
cheap unskilled labour and natural resources-- are less important than before. The combined effects 
of technical change, the internationalization of production and raw-material substitution have resulted 
in a declining participation of raw materials, fuels and foodstuffs in both international trade and world 
markets, while new comparative advantages are related to the development of human capital and the 
capacity to integrate and assimilate technological change.53 It is not surprising that Latin American 
share in world exports dropped from 12.4% in 1950, to 5.5% in 1970 and 3.9% in 
The simultaneous application of export promotion policies by small Third World economies 
has led to a frequent oversupply in primary product markets, while technological change has 
negatively affected demand. This situation resulted in a severe decline of terms of trade for most 
primary products. Under these international conditions, prospects for economic recovery based on 
primary export promotion seem seriously limited. 
At the same time, structural adjustment policies have negatively affected public expenditure 
in education and health and hence human capital formation, reducing even more the potential for 
dynamic comparative advantages in small countries. Moreover, market-friendly policies discouraged 
state-induced export promotion policies, which helped successful South East Asian countries to move 
to higher echelons in the international division of labor.55 
Summarizing, the application of market-friendly export promotion and structural adjustment 
policies in small Third World countries, under the current international conditions, does not seem to 
be an efficient way to increase export purchasing power, given the shrinking relevance of cheap 
unskilled labour and other traditional comparative advantages of these countries. 
Common traits with other small Latin American countries explain only partially the inadequate 
results of SAP in Ecuador. Export diversification, and particularly the expansion of manufactured 
exports in Ecuador have been weaker than in most small LAC countries. Moreover, at least one small 
country, Costa Rica, have achieved a remarkable diversification. Only country-specific factors can 
explain the diversity of outcomes among small economies in the region. Several specific thesis have 
been posed to analyze the Ecuadorean experience. 
See Manuel Castells, "The Informational Economy and the New International Division of Labor", in The New 
Global Economy in the Information Age, by Martin Carony, Manuel Castells, Stephen Cohen and Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso, University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993; David Harvey, The Condition of 
Postmodernity. 
See FAQ, La Politica Agncola en el Nuevo Estilo de Desarrollo Latinoamericasno, Santiago: FAQ, 1994. 
See Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian 
Industrialization, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990; Frederic Deyo, The Political Economy of the New Asian 
Industrialism, New York: Cornell University Press, 1988; Gary Gereffi and Donald Wyman, eds., Manufacturing 
Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. 
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According to Hofman and Buitelaar, Ecuador's economic growth has been historically based 
on natural-resource export cycles, and affected by high long-term instability.56 As a result, both a rent- 
seeking behavior among Ecuadorian entrepreneurs, and lasting "Dutch Disease"effects have reduced 
the country's potential for export diversification. Consequently, an export promotion strategy, based 
mostly on market-friendly mechanisms, have reduced prospects in Ecuador, and a well defined 
regulatory state role is necessary to achieve long term growth. 
De Janvry et al point out a set of economic, social, political and institutional factors.57 A deep- 
rooted regionalism, and the prevalence of highly specialized regional-based portfolios within capitalist 
classes have prevented the emergence of a national-based dominant class, able to consolidate 
consensus or hegemony. Particular interest groups prevailed instead in policy making. Additionally, 
Dutch Disease have created a "bonanza philosophy"among elites, with little inclination to sacrifices. 
"Interest groups are highly divided and parochial in their demands, pursuing predatory ends with little 
co-operation in the quest for net social gains".58 Additionally, a political system with highly 
fragmented and unstable parties makes difficult to achieve lasting alliances. 
From a comparative perspective, Thorp analyzes the contrast between Colombia and Peru in 
the historical evolution of their macro economic management capabilities.59 While the former has 
developed an early and strong managerial capacity, the latter performed poorly. Thorp explains the 
difference studying diverging historical conditions in the constitution of capitalist classes and their 
relationship with the state. The Ecuadorean experience probably lies between those contrasting cases. 
Thorp's analysis sheds light on the relationship between the historical constitution of dominant classes 
and the development of their managerial capacities, both in the private and public sectors. 
Based on these arguments and my own research, it can be inferred that Ecuadorean 
entrepreneurial classes evolved in a historical sequence of easy, albeit short lived, primary export 
cycles.60 The extraction of international differential rents played an important role in the process of 
André Hofman and Rudolf Buitelaar, "Ventajas Comparativas Extraordinarias y Crecimiento a Largo 
Plazo: El Caso del Ecuador", Revista de Ia CEPAL 54 (December 1994). 
See De Janvrv et a!, The Political Feasibffity of Adjustment in Ecuador and Venezuela. 
Ibid. P. 18. 
See Rosemary Thorp, Economic Management and Economic Development in Peru and Colombia, 
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991. 
60 
See Carlos Larrea, Malva Espinosa and PaOla Sylva, El Banano en el Ecuador, Quito: Corporacion Editora 
Nacional, 1987; Carlos Larrea, "Proyectos Deinocráticos y Estrategias de Desarrollo para el Ecuador: Una Vision 
Retrospectiva" (Paper prepared for the Seminar "Democracia, Desarrollo y DescentralizaciOn", Universidad de Cuenca, 
Cuenca, October 1994). 
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class conformation.6' Moreover, during the oil boom period, generous state incentives and subsidies 
allowed rapid accumulation. As a result, a high propensity to sumptuary consumption predominated 
among Ecuadorean elites, and also oligopolistic and inefficient market structures prevailed in the 
economy. Under these circumstances, Ecuadorean entrepreneurial classes do not have developed 
sufficient skills to openly compete and successfully expand in international markets without state 
protection. Moreover, they have been unable to consolidate an stable and hegemonic political 
strategy. Consequently, both internal fragmentation (with a strong regional component) and weak 
economic and political response capacity of entrepreneurial classes affected the results of adjustment 
programs in Ecuador. Of course, adequate economic skills, social cohesion and political capabilities 
can only be achieved in the medium term. 
Turning to a specific analysis of the social effects of the crisis and adjustment policies, a 
strong social deterioration is observed from 1982 onwards. Specific information for the 1987-1993 
period in the urban sector corroborates the trend. The most important changes are income 
concentration, declining wages and increased wage dispersion, a reduction in public services, rising 
poverty levels, a deterioration in the employment structure with higher underemployment and 
unemployment rates, and a higher heterogeneity in educational returns, affecting unskilled workers. 
The slight recovery observed in 1993 dos not include a reduction in income concentration, and its 
future continuity and strength are still unclear. 
From a neoclassical perspective, most short term social costs will be outweighed by long term 
gains of economic recovery. Structural adjustment incentives a production shift from non-tradable 
to tradable goods, and a sound and stable expansion of export and import competing activities. As 
these activities will adapt to the relative factor endowments of the country, they will be likely 
intensive in the use of unskilled labour, and expand employment. Wage dispersion will be reduced, 
as the country specializes in unskilled labour intensive production, and income distribution will 
improve as well, as employment in the modern sector absorbs labour surplus in the traditional 
subsistence sector. Later on, when a labour surplus will be completely absorbed, wages will begin to 
increase improving social indicators again. 
Unfortunately, in the case of Ecuador, signs of economic recovery, transfer from non-tradable 
to tradable production, and export-based growth, are still weak, and probably continue being so for 
some time in the future. The expansion in labour demand generated by growth in agricultural exports 
is small, and does not have significant indirect effects on urban employment and wages. Consequently, 
short terms social costs of adjustment policies are still dominant, compared with hypothetical future 
gains. Small Latin American economies are heterogeneous. Nevertheless, both their common 
problems in export-expansion, and their modest economic results reveal that the Ecuadorean 
experience may be partially representative. 
61 A differential rent can be defmed as "the residual component of market price over production cost where all 
reproducible factors of production (labour, capital) are paid at market prices". (Alan Geib et al., Oil Windfalls: Blessing 
of Curse?, New York: Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 6). The main economic cycles in Ecuador's history have been 
associated to three primary exports: cacao (1860-1920), bananas (1948-1971) and petroleum (1982 to present). 
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Although negative short term social repercussions of adjustment policies are evident, it is 
difficult to identify direct causal links between specific adjustment measures and their social effects. 
It is also complex to differentiate between the effects of the economic crisis, the adjustment programs, 
and the transformation in the international context. This is so because of the simultaneity of economic 
stagnation, the application of different adjustment components --real devaluations, subsidy reduction, 
labour deregulation, import liberalization, state reduction, and so on-- and the international diffusion 
of technological change. Despite the adobe problems, some hypothetical social effects of specific 
adjustment policies and other factors can be mentioned. 
Real devaluation produces an increase of relative prices of tradable goods, and therefore 
reduces real wages. Additionally, devaluations generate at least a short term inflationary effect. 
Persistent inflation affects negatively wages and income distribution. In oligopolistic market 
structures, which are prevailing in Ecuador's modern sector, corporations increase prices by 
their mark-up margin, while both small competitive enterprises in the informal sector and 
agriculture, and workers are affected. Between 1982 and 1988, repeated devaluations and high fiscal 
deficits (particularly in 1987) generated a chronic inflationary problem, as inflation rates rose to very 
high levels by Ecuador's historical standards (see Table 2). In a context of slow economic growth, 
the devaluation-inflation effect was probably the most important specific mechanism of income 
transfer from labour to capital. After 1988 real devaluations became moderate and from 1990 a real 
appreciation in exchange rates reversed the currency trend. Inflation rates declined as well from 75% 
in 1989 to 27% in 1994, as inflation control became a priority in adjustment policies.62 Therefore, the 
regressive effect of inflation and nominal devaluations became smaller. 
The expected positive effect of real devaluation on export expansion has been limited in 
Ecuador to primary products. Bananas is the most important among them, although the effect of 
devaluation on export growth is hard to demonstrate in this case. The positive employment effect, 
however, has been mitigated by technological change, as new technologies severely reduce labour 
demand,63 In other primary products, like fresh flowers, significant employment expansion has been 
confined to a micro-regional level. In the case of import-competing products, labour intensity may 
has increased somewhat. 
Subsidy reduction or elimination affected mostly middle and urban popular classes. Food 
subsidies (wheat, imported powered milk) were reduced in the mid 1 980s, and oil subsidies were 
partially reduced during the 1980s. As inflation repeatedly ate away oil price hikes, oil subsidy prices 
became chaotic. Only in the mid 1 990s oil and energy subsidies were eliminated. As a result of 
interest rate liberalization adopted in the mid 1 980s, credit became more concentrated and subsidized 
credit for small producers was drastically reduced, thus increasing income concentration. Thus 
62 
See Luis Jácome, "Dc la Infiación Crónica a la Inflación Moderada en ci Ecuador", Revista de Ia CEPAL 52 
(April 1994). 
63See Larrea, Espinosa and Syiva, El Banano en el Ecuador. 
64 
See Larrea, "The Mirage of Development: Oil, Employment and Poverty in Ecuador (1972-1990)". 
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regressive effects of real-price policies were spread out during the I 980s and became concentrated 
after 1992. 
Labour market deregulation and wage repression have an obvious negative impact of formal- 
sector wages, although it is expected to stimulate the adoption of labour intensive technologies in the 
medium term. This policy was implemented from 1984 onwards. 
State reduction policies has different effects. Declining public investment affects employment 
(particularly in construction) and reduces growth both in the short and medium term. A shrinking 
state apparatus has adverse direct and indirect effects on urban employment (particularly among 
middle classes) and also affects labour market structures. Additionally, a decline in social expenditure 
usually negatively affects non-monetary consumption among popular sectors, as subsidized or free 
education, health and other social services are cut. The long term negative effect on human capital 
formation must be considered as well. The reduction of the public sector was a continuous trend in 
the period, with a concentration after 1992. 
Trade liberalization, as mentioned, has a negative impact in formerly protected domestic 
production, particularly small-scale manufacturing activities, increasing unemployment. Additionally, 
it incentives sumptuary consumption among elites, thus reducing savings propensity and future 
growth. Its negative effect on employment and income distribution is clearly suggested by empirical 
information, which discloses a strong change around 1990, when trade barriers were drastically 
reduced. 
Trade liberalization incentives also the adoption of technical change. New technologies are 
labour saving, have higher skilled-labour demand, and tend to displace traditional unskilled- labour 
intensive activities. The continuous change in the educational return structure, and particularly the 
transformation in the second partial derivative of wages with respect to education,65 suggest a key 
role of technical change on the labour market structure. 
Finally, debt service generates a large capital outflow and increase pressure on public budgets, 
take resources away from investment, and delays economic recovery. Debt service has increased over 
time (excepting some years) becoming very high --7% of GDP-- in the last years. 
Summarizing, the specific social effects of adjustment policies are difficult to identify. 
Nevertheless, it can be hypothetically inferred that some components of the policy reform package, 
such as state reduction, subsidy elimination have produced a continuous effect, while other policies 
had concentrated repercussions. Devaluation and inflation social effects prevailed in the early I 980s, 
whereas trade liberalization has been a strong factor in worsening social conditions since 1990. The 
observed transformation of educational returns seem to be mostly an effect of the diflujsion of new 
technologies. 
65 Wages are included in logarithmic form in the regression equation. 
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Concluding, a strong social deterioration prevailed in Ecuador during the adjustment years, 
while the expected economic recovery has been elusive. Nevertheless, the country has been able to 
avoid dramatic social and political crisis which affected other small LAC countries. The case study 
sheds light on the analysis of the specific economic, social and political conditions of small and 
medium Latin American countries in the current turbulent times. 
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APPENDLX TABLE 1 
EXPORT PURCHASING POWER BY MAIN PRODUCTS: 1970-1994 
(million 1975 USS) 
Year Oil & Dc- Bananas Coffee, Cacao Fishery Other Total 
rivatives & Elaborates Products Products Exports 
1970 1.8 151.1 136.5 11 45.5 345.8 
1971 1.7 152.5 110.9 24 55.5 344.9 
1972 94.2 209.1 124.5 29 63.9 520.5 
1973 387.3 101.3 138.2 29 72.5 728.0 
1974 783.0 142.7 220.2 30 86.5 1262.8 
1975 588.0 139.0 139.0 32 76.0 974.0 
1976 736.0 102.4 287.4 42 83.5 1251.1 
1977 654.1 135.8 389.9 51 86.2 1317.4 
1978 575.2 120.8 424.8 50 75.2 1245.6 
1979 823.8 109.8 385.3 55 97.2 1471.3 
1980 990.5 124.1 225.3 105 125.3 1570.3 
1981 903.6 143.4 177.8 106 129.3 1459.7 
1982 1049.8 79.8 185.1 142 82.6 1538.9 
1983 1169.1 103.8 140.1 118 51.9 1583.0 
1984 1349.7 99.4 252.4 169 57.4 1928.2 
1985 1418.2 161.9 311.3 196 50.8 2137.9 
1986 603.4 161.6 292.5 238 47.3 1343.2 
1987 395.0 145.7 191.5 262 57.8 1051.9 
1988 498.2 152.6 151.1 261 56.7 1119.3 
1989 590.7 190.4 139.4 234 56.6 1211.3 
1990 655.2 217.8 121.5 201 67.5 1263.0 
1991 540.1 335.7 104.5 272 84.4 1336.6 
1992 608.8 294.6 70.1 287 109.5 1369.6 
1993 578.9 261.9 92.4 283 198.6 1414.6 
1994 611.8 304.7 230.7 338 257.1 1742.6 
Notes: Export purchasmg power was estimated by deflating current exports by the UN pnce index of manufactures 
exported b developed countries. 
Sources: Banco Central del Ecuador, Boletin Anuario (several issues); Banco Central del Ecuador, Información 
Estadistica Mensual (several issues); United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (several issues). 
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APPENDIX TABLE 2 
IMPORTS BY MAIN KIND OF PRODUCTS (1968-1994) 
(Million USS and percentages) 
Year Total Imports Consumer Agriculture Manufacturing Agriculture Manufacturing Other 
US$(CIF) Goods Inputs Inputs Capital Goods Capital Goods Products 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
1968 255.5 14.6 1.9 39.6 2.6 16.3 24.9 
1969 241.8 14.5 2.1 39.7 2,6 15.5 25.6 
1970 273.8 13.2 2.0 42.4 2.8 15.3 24.3 
1971 340.1 11.2 1.1 34.7 2.0 18.6 32.4 
1972 318.6 14.5 1.4 33.1 1.4 24.0 25.6 
1973 397.3 16.1 1.4 37.6 1.4 21.1 22.3 
1974 678.2 15.0 3.8 37.5 2.1 18.1 23.5 
1975 987.0 13.1 4.7 29.6 3,6 23.9 25.0 
1976 958.3 11.2 3.1 32.8 3.1 26.2 23.6 
1977 1188.5 12.0 1.8 33.7 3.1 24.4 25.0 
1978 1505.1 13.5 2.1 29.7 3.0 27.1 24.5 
1979 1599.7 13.0 2.0 31.6 1.9 27.8 23.8 
1980 2253.3 10.8 2.6 32.3 1.7 22.8 29.8 
1981 1920.6 10.4 2.2 27.0 1.8 26.5 32.0 
1982 2424.6 11.3 2.5 32.4 1.4 24.1 28.3 
1983 1474.6 12.4 3.4 45.2 1.5 23.7 13.8 
1984 1630.0 11.1 4.0 43.5 0.9 17.4 23.1 
1985 1766.7 8.6 4.1 43.5 1.9 19.2 22.7 
1986 1810.2 9.4 3.5 40.1 1.9 22.5 22.6 
1987 2158.1 9.7 2.4 36.7 1.3 23.2 26.7 
1988 1713.5 9.6 3.6 41.3 0.7 23.6 21.2 
1989 1854.8 9.9 4.9 45.2 0.7 21.0 18.2 
1990 1861.7 9.6 4.6 43.6 1.4 20.2 20.7 
1991 2398.6 10.6 4.8 41.2 1.0 22.1 20.3 
1992 2430.4 16.3 4.7 34.4 0.8 22.6 21.2 
1993 2562.2 22.8 3.3 30.6 0.7 23.7 19.0 
1994 3642.2 23.6 3.4 28.0 0.6 17.9 26.5 
Sources: Banco Central del Ecuador, BoletIn Anuario (several issues); Banco Central del Ecuador, Informacion 
EstadIstica Mensual (several issues). 
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APPENDIX TABLE 3 
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- Variables in the Equation 
Variable B SEB T Sig T 
Multiple R 
R Squared 
Adjusted R Squared 
Standard Error 
JULY 1993 
Variables in the Equation 
Variable B SEB T Sig T 
EDUCFOR .021955 .015607 1.407 .1597 
EDUCFOR2 .003405 7.1340E—04 4.774 .0000 
EXPERIEN .050507 .005961 8.473 .0000 
EXPERIE2 —.001087 2.6371E—04 —4.124 .0000 
EXPERIE3 6.57751E—06 3.2180E—06 2.044 .0411 
FEMALE —.258646 .026653 —9.704 .0000 
INFORMAL —.067919 .088392 —.768 .4423 
AGRICULT —.032332 .099985 —.323 .7464 
DOMESTIC —.350263 .118404 —2.958 .0031 
PUBLIC .194443 .165687 1.174 .2407 
EDUCPUB —9.76135E—04 .030414 —.032 .9744 
EDUC2PUB —.001269 .001316 —.964 .3349 
DOMEEDUC —.031043 .017557 —1.768 .0772 
INFOEDUC —.020502 .009463 —2.166 .0304 
AGRIEDUC .005366 .011965 .448 .6539 





EDUCFOR .016862 .021662 .778 .4365 
EDUCFOR2 .003172 9.7998E—04 3.236 .0012 
EXPERIEN .037098 .008608 4.310 .0000 
EXPERIE2 —5.24508E—04 3.8754E—04 —1.353 .1762 
EXPERIE3 3.15905E—07 4.8038E—06 .066 .9476 
FEMALE —.232263 .038754 —5.993 .0000 
INFORMAL —.133175 .123686 —1.077 .2818 
AGRICULT —.103581 .135680 —.763 .4454 
DOMESTIC —.533516 .177192 —3.011 .0027 
PUBLIC .002818 .229845 .012 .9902 
EDUCPUB .037557 .042434 .885 .3763 
EDUC2PUB —.002781 .001833 —1.517 .1295 
DOMEEDUC —.016383 .025245 —.649 .5165 
INFOEDUC —.021494 .013297 —1.617 .1063 
AGRIEDUC 4.79675E—04 .016154 .030 .9763 
(Constant) 9.316741 .129005 72.220 .0000 
Multiple R 
R Squared 






Variables in the Equation 

















































































Meaning of variable names: 
LOGSAL88: Natural Logarithm of Wages (Nov—1988 sucres/month) 
EDUCFOR: Years of formal education. 
EDUCFOR2: EDUCFOR squared. 
EXPERIEN: Years of experience. 
EXPERIE2: EXPERIEN Squared. 
EXPERIE3: (EXPERIEN)3 
FEMALE: Dummy for females. 
INFORMAL: Dummy for informal sector. 
AGRICULT: Dummy for agricultural workers. 
DOMESTIC: Dummy for domestic servants. 
PUBLIC: Dummy for public servants. 
EDUCPUB: (PUBLIC) x (EDUCFOR) interaction. 
EDUC2PUB: (PUBLIC) x (EDUCFOR2) interaction. 
DOMEEDUC: (DOMESTIC) x (EDUCFOR) interaction. 
INFOEDUC: (INFORMAL) x (EDUCFOR) interaction. 




Note: Workers with very low wages (lower than 3000 sucreslmonth) and very high estimated experience (greater than 70 
years) were excluded from the regression. 
Sources: INEM and [NEC, Encuesta de Hogares (unpublished data base, several years). 
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APPENDIX TABLE 4 
SIMPLIFIED REGRESSION MODEL FOR WAGES AS A FUNCTION OF 





Adjusted R Squared .41866 
Standard Error .57041 
Variables in the Equation 
Variable B SEB T Sig T 
Meaning of variable names: 
LOGSAL88: Natural Logarithm of Wages (Nov-l988 sucres/month) 
EDUCFOR: Years of formal education. 
EXPERIEN: Years of experience. 
EXPERIE2: EXPERIEN Squared. 
FEMALE: Dummy for females. 
INFORMAL: Dummy for informal sector. 
AGRICULT: Dummy for agricultural workers. 
DOMESTIC: Dummy for domestic servants. 
PUBLIC: Dummy for public servants. 
Sources: INEM and INEC, Encuesta de Hogares (unpublished data base, several years). 
.64724 
.41892 
EDUCFOR .070724 .001168 60.571 .0000 
EXPERIEN .040531 .001030 39.359 .0000 
EXPERIE2 —5.58766E—04 2.0186E—05 —27.681 .0000 
FEMALE —.257379 .009842 —26.151 .0000 
INFORMAL —.289804 .012543 —23.105 .0000 
AGRICULT —.029645 .018065 —1.641 .1008 
DOMESTIC —.641765 .018764 —34.202 .0000 
PUBLIC .056842 .010964 5.184 .0000 
(Constant) 9.161029 .018109 505.886 .0000 
Note: Workers with very low wages (lower than 3000 sucres/month) and very high estimated experience (greater than 70 
years) were exchided from the regression. Regression includes urban wage earners, from 988 to 993. 
INDICATOR 
Life expectancy 
at birth (years) 
Adult illiteracy rate (%) 
Average scholarly (years) 
Infant mortality rate for 
children under 5 years 
(per 1000 live births) 
UNDP Human Development 
Index (from 0 to 1) 
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, 1992. 
66 
APPENDIX TABLE 5 
COMPARATIVE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS FOR ECUADOR, PERU 
AND COSTA RICA (1990) 
ECUADOR PERU COSTA RICA 
66.0 63.0 74.9 
14.2 14.9 7.2 
5.6 6.4 5.7 
83 116 22 
0.641 0.600 0.842 
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